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This Article considers the question of whether statutory rape laws 
can and should be used against members of the class they were designed 
to protect. Many commentators have argued that meaningfully 
consensual sex among similarly situated and sufficiently mature 
teenagers should be beyond the scope of strict liability rape laws, but the 
question becomes more fraught in the context of the “contested outer 
limits” of adolescent sexuality – sexual contact among children and 
adolescents that offends social norms, leads to harmful outcomes or 
appears to be exploitative. What are the implications of using statutory 
rape laws against minors to target “bad sex”?  
I contend that even in relation to “bad sex”, there are serious policy 
and constitutional objections to the use of statutory rape laws against a 
member of the class they are designed to protect. In jurisdictions without 
all-encompassing age-gap provisions, the response to sex among 
adolescents needs to be reformulated to ensure that the use of statutory 
rape laws against minors is confined to cases involving wrongful, as 
opposed to mere bad, sex, and is predicated on a clear and objective 
definition of exploitation, as opposed to mere fornication, as the punitive 
target. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of when and how to use the law to regulate youthful 
sexual encounters is both urgent and analytically complex. Juveniles 
today are immersed in an online world that grants unprecedented access 
to sexual imagery and discourse. Sexual development is a significant and 
natural aspect of the transition to adulthood, but society and the law 
rightly recognize that children and teenagers are a relatively vulnerable 
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and immature population. Statutory rape laws1 respond to this tension 
with a generalization, setting an age of consent at which adolescents are 
deemed mature enough to make safe and meaningfully consensual 
decisions about sex. These laws create a protected class whose sexual 
autonomy and privacy interests are restricted in order to protect them 
from power imbalances and harmful decision-making. 
Statutory rape laws have undergone a number of waves of reform, 
including a movement towards gender-neutrality and abandonment of 
traditional chastity requirements.2 In a significant reform trend, many 
jurisdictions have adopted an age-gap approach to statutory rape, 
excluding sex between close-in-age minors from the reach of statutory 
rape laws, even as those minors are deemed legally incapable of 
consenting to sex with adults. However, not all sex among minors is 
covered by such so-called “Romeo and Juliet” 3 exceptions. Accordingly, 
it is often the case that where two minors engage in sexual contact, each 
has technically committed statutory rape.4 This raises a potential problem: 
can and should statutory rape laws be used against members of the class 
they were designed to protect? 
To date, most scholarship on the use of statutory rape laws against 
minors has focused on an abstract “charmed circle” 5  of “good” 
adolescent sex – meaningfully consensual sex among similarly situated6 
and sufficiently mature teenagers who are arguably entitled to some 
measure of sexual privacy and autonomy – and seems to accepts that the 
use of statutory rape laws against the protected class to target minor-
minor sex beyond that circle is less objectionable. This Article shifts the 
focus to the “contested outer limits”7 of juvenile sexuality – to sexual 
                                                      
 
1 Criminalized sexual activity with a person under a specified age or within a specified age 
range is generally known as statutory rape, a strict liability offense, as distinct from common-law 
forcible rape, although the term statutory rape “is not used in statutes, and technically … has no legal 
meaning”: Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 
LAW & PHILOSOPHY 35, 62 (1992). 
2 See, generally, CAROLYN E. COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 12-23 (2004). 
3 Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leary, 15 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505, 527, note 79 (2008) (“Special, lenient exemptions for sex among 
teenage peers are commonly referred to as ‘Romeo and Juliet’ laws, in recognition of the fact that to 
stand in the way of a relationship that might blossom into true love would indeed be a tragedy of 
Shakespearean proportions.”). 
4 See, e.g., People v. T.W., 685 NE.2d 631 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1997); Pappas v Zorzi, No. 11 C 
6239, 2013 US Dist. (N.D. Ill Dec. 3, 2013). 
5 Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in 
PLEASURE AND DANGER 267, 281 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1993) (infra at note 15 and accompanying 
text; arguing that “modern Western societies appraise sex acts according to a hierarchical system of 
sexual value” and diagramming a “charmed circle” of good, normal and natural sexuality). 
6 That is, adolescents who are of a similar age and, generally, not in a relationship that is 
presumed to involve a status-based power differential such as coach/player, teacher/student. 
7 Rubin, supra note 5. 
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contact among children and adolescents that offends social norms, leads 
to harmful outcomes, or appears to be exploitative. To explore those 
outer limits, this Article adopts Professor Alan Wertheimer’s distinction 
between “good” sex (sex considered morally worthy or at least tolerable); 
“bad” or morally unworthy sex; and “wrongful” or morally 
impermissible sex.8 I contend that there are serious constitutional and 
policy objections with strict liability statutory rape laws that can be 
applied to sexual contact between members of the same protected class, 
even in cases where the intended punitive target is “bad sex” (involving, 
for example, immature adolescents or harmful outcomes such as 
pregnancy) or “wrongful sex” (involving exploitation of a minor-victim 
by a minor-predator). Those objections call for statutory and policy 
reforms in our approach to sex among adolescents. 
In Part II, by way of background, I discuss competing sex-negative 
and sex-positive discourses on adolescent sexuality; the contested nature 
of the normative boundaries between good, bad and wrongful adolescent 
sex; and how age of consent laws and age-gap reforms attempt to 
account for these complexities. 
In Part III, I consider criminal or juvenile statutory rape proceedings 
against members of the protected class, which generally take one of two 
forms: proceedings against both minors, under the theory that each is 
both victim and offender in relation to the same act; or one-sided 
proceedings against the “true offender”. In either case there are serious 
policy and constitutional problems with using statutory rape laws against 
a member of the class such laws are designed to protect. First, the idea 
that minors can mutually victimize one another is illogical; statutory rape 
proceedings against minors for consensual sex with minors are in fact a 
punitive response to sex per se, not victimization. This conflates two 
discrete ethical breaches—fornication and exploitation—and risks both 
diluting the moral authority of statutory rape laws and unfairly labeling 
mere fornicators as sex abusers.  
Even in cases involving good-faith attempts to use statutory rape 
laws discerningly to target sex involving victimization of a vulnerable 
minor by a predatory minor, selective enforcement of statutory rape laws 
against the “true offender” where both minors are legally violators is 
predicated on an undefined notion of exploitation. This gives rise to the 
potential for discriminatory enforcement and over-criminalization of 
adolescent sex, based on prosecutorial beliefs about the normative 
boundaries of good, bad and wrongful sex.  
In Part IV, I discuss how the legal response to sex among adolescents 
should be reformulated. Because modern statutory rape statutes properly 
                                                      
 
8 ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS, 5 (2003). 
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presuppose an exploitative victim-offender binary, their use should be 
confined to cases involving wrongful, as opposed to merely bad, sex. To 
that end, the enforcement of statutory rape laws against minors should be 
predicated on a clear and objective definition of exploitation, which is 
best achieved by per se rules about the validity of consent based on 
presumed age-based power differentials. To the extent that such 
measures may fail to fully capture all instances of arguably wrongful sex 
– such as sex that is problematically coercive but not demonstrably 
nonconsensual – sex abuse statutes may need to be (i) strengthened to 
ensure that fault-based rape laws adequately target coercive but non-
forcible sex among juveniles, and (ii) supplemented with juvenile-
specific offenses targeting problematic sexual behavior warranting 
reformative intervention. 
 
II. THE COMPLEXITY OF ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY 
A. Contested Boundaries of Good, Bad and Wrongful Adolescent Sex 
American culture is relatively non-permissive with respect to 
juvenile9 sexual activity.10  Public discourse on sex with and among 
adolescents often focuses on their presumed immaturity and inexperience, 
their susceptibility to sexual manipulation and coercion, and adverse 
outcomes such as pregnancy and emotional and physical injury.11 A 
                                                      
 
9 The focus of this Article is the use of statutory rape laws against minors those laws are 
designed to protect; accordingly, references to juveniles can be taken to mean all young persons 
below the legal age of consent, which is sixteen or older in most states: Michelle Oberman, 
Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 
703 (2000) (hereinafter “Regulating Consensual Sex”). 
10 Floyd M. Martinson, Sexual Development in Infancy and Childhood, in JUVENILE SEXUAL 
OFFENDING: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CORRECTION 36, 36 (Gail Ryan and Sandy Lane eds., 
2nd ed., 1997) (“Sexuality is seldom treated as a strong or healthy force in the positive development 
of a child’s personality in the United States.”); Rubin, supra note 5, 268-75; LAURA J. ZILNEY AND 
LISA ANNE ZILNEY, PERVERTS AND PREDATORS: THE MAKING OF SEXUAL OFFENDING LAWS, 177 
(2009) (“America is a sex-negative country…”). See, generally, Kate Millett, Beyond Politics? 
Children and Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 217, 218-20 
(Carole S. Vance ed., 1984); STEVI JACKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SEXUALITY, 49, 105 (1982); Peggy 
Orenstein, When Did Porn Become Sex Ed?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/opinion/sunday/when-did-porn-become-sex-ed.html?_r=2.  
11 See, e.g., Ron Stodghill II, Where’d You Learn That?, TIME, June 15, 1998 (“We should not 
confuse kids’ pseudo-sophistication about sexuality and their ability to use the language with their 
understanding of who they are as sexual people or their ability to make good decisions”, citing 
Debra Haffner of the Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States); R. Kachur 
et. al., Adolescents, Technology and Reducing Risk for HIV, STDs and Pregnancy, ATLANTA, GA: 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 7 (2013) (“[Teens] remain a vulnerable 
population when it comes to sexual risk.”); COCCA, supra note 2, 32 (2004) (noting the “moral panic” 
of Americans in the 80s/90s about “children having children”); Laina Bay-Cheng, The Trouble of 
Teen Sex: the Construction of Adolescent Sexuality through School-Based Sexuality Education, 3(1) 
SEX EDUCATION 61 (2003) (arguing that school-based sexuality education “attends exclusively to 
the dangers and risks associated with teen sex”); Elizabeth Hollenberg, The Criminalization of 
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significant majority of adults believe that premarital sex among teens is 
wrong,12 and this moral disapproval has been consistently high since the 
1980s.13  In one sense, then, we might say that there is no such thing as 
“good” adolescent sex—according to majority American social norms, 
sex among unmarried adolescents is per se morally unworthy and 
undesirable. However, a competing discourse of sex positivity 
acknowledges the sexual dimension of development, and recognizes that 
mutually agreed upon adolescent sexual encounters can in certain 
contexts be a normal and healthy aspect of the transition to adulthood, 
and are not per se morally problematic, undesirable or unsafe.14 
To explore the intersection of these two perspectives, Professor 
Sutherland adopts Gayle Rubin’s hierarchical approach to sexuality, 
which posits a “charmed circle” of sexuality that is privileged by society 
                                                                                                                         
 
Teenage Sex: Statutory Rape and the Politics of Teenage Motherhood, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
267, 268 (1998) (discussing the political narrative of the “teenage mother as child victim”); Rigel 
Oliveri, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 STAN. L. REV. 463, 
468-74 (discussing the mid-1990s welfare reform movement’s focus on the problem of teen 
pregnancy); Meg Bostrom, The 21st Century Teen: Public Perception and Teen Reality, 
FRAMEWORKS INSTITUTE (Dec. 2001) (available at 
http://frameworksinstitute.org/assets/files/PDF/youth_public_perceptions.pdf), 21 (“Though the 
public knows teens are having sex, and supports sex education in the schools, this is not an 
endorsement of sex for teens. They want teens to wait.”). Policy measures aimed at promoting 
abstinence still abound in America—see, e.g., Bostrom, 20 (reporting that 58% of schools teach that 
“young people should wait to have sex, but if they don’t they should use birth control and practice 
safer sex” and 34% teach that “young people should only have sex when they are married”); 
Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States, A History of Federal Funding for 
Abstinence-Only-Until Marriage Programs (available at 
http://www.siecus.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=1340&nodeid=1); but see 
infra note 29. 
12  General Social Survey 2006, NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, 
http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/GSS2006.asp (71.4% of survey participants 
responded that premarital heterosexual sex among 14- to 16-year-olds is “always wrong”, compared 
to 25.6% vis. adult premarital sex). 
13 Bostrom, supra note 11 (reporting on National Opinion Research Center’s General Social 
Surveys, which show that the “always wrong” response to teens having sex before marriage has 
“hovered in the high 60s [%] throughout the 1980s and 1990s, reaching a high of 71% in 1998, and a 
low of 66% in 1986”); but see COCCA, supra note 2, 31-32   (noting potential problems with the 
wording of the GSS teen sex question, but concluding that the surveys “still overwhelmingly 
condemn adolescent sex”). 
14 Bay-Cheng, supra note 11, 65 (noting that “a growing number of experts in the field of 
adolescent sexuality … argue for the presentation of sexuality as a positive and healthy aspect of 
life … and for the need to help adolescents determine not only when to say ‘no,’ but when to say 
‘yes,’ as well”). See, generally, WERTHEIMER, supra note 8, 217 and 220 (noting that “there is 
considerable controversy with respect to the harmfulness of youthful sex”, discussing arguments that 
consensual sex by minors is “no big deal”, and noting that at least some of the harm of adolescent 
sexual activity is “socially constructed” and derives from social norms about the impropriety of early 
sexual relations); JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN 
FROM SEX (2002) (arguing that sexual pleasure is not inherently unsafe for children and teens); 
ZILNEY AND ZILNEY, supra note 10, xiv (2009) (adopting a “sex-positive viewpoint, meaning that 
sex is good—and good for you—and that society must learn to deal with it in a more open, forthright 
manner”); Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation of Statutory Rape Laws, 
4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 322-23 (1996) (discussing positive aspects of adolescent sexuality). 
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and deemed “normal, natural, blessed”; and “outer limits” of sex that is 
considered “abnormal, unnatural, damned”.15 Sutherland considers how 
factors such as gender, class, race, sexual orientation, outcomes 
(pregnancy, sexually transmitted disease) and age impact social tolerance 
for adolescent sexuality. 16  Sutherland’s analysis points to a useful 
starting point for the current Article: the normative boundary between 
morally “good” and morally “bad” adolescent sex is dynamic and 
contested.  
Of course, some types of sexual interactions are near-universally 
condemned as not only bad or morally unworthy, but as incontrovertibly 
wrongful or morally impermissible—most obviously, sex involving 
manipulation, coercion or exploitation of the young and vulnerable.17 As 
Floyd Martinson notes, “[a]lthough we do not yet have societal 
agreement about what constitutes age-appropriate child sexual behavior, 
we do have a universal norm that infants and children should not be 
sexually abused.” 18 But even here, there is not always a clear dividing 
line between sexual activity and sexual abuse, acceptable persuasion and 
impermissible coercion, consent and nonconsent, or childhood incapacity 
and coming-of-age competence. 19  This causes analytical complexity 
when it comes to regulating juvenile sexual behavior.  
 
B. Age of Consent and Age Span Rules as Bright-Line Proxies for 
Contested Boundaries 
Statutory rape laws respond to this complexity with a generalization, 
by setting an age at which adolescents are deemed sufficiently mature to 
make safe and meaningfully consensual decisions about sex, and at 
which point sexual activity is no longer per se legally impermissible. The 
age of consent thereby functions as a bright-line proxy for the boundary 
between wrongful sex, involving a presumptively incompetent and 
exploited juvenile, and good or at least morally permissible sex.20 This 
                                                      
 
15 Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of 
Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313, 335-36 (2002-2003); see, further, Rubin, 
supra note 5, 280-81. 
16 Id., 353 (for example, “[t]he center of the charmed circle would be made up of heterosexual 
sex between white, middle-class teenage peers who are engaged in monogamous relationships. 
Various sexual acts short of intercourse would be okay between younger teenagers, while intercourse 
would be okay for those who have attained a certain age and have taken appropriate precautions to 
avoid pregnancy and STD’s.”). 
17 For discussion of the meaning of sexual exploitation, see infra Part IV.A. 
18 Martinson, supra note 11, 53. 
19 Oliveri, supra note 11, 485 (noting that the sexual encounters of adolescents often take place 
in “the gray area between consent and coercion”). 
20 See, generally, WERTHEIMER, supra note 8, 215-222 (discussing age as a proxy for the 
emotional and cognitive capacities that are relevant to the validity of consent); Millett, supra note 10, 
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approach involves a legal fiction, because the childhood-adulthood 
transition is a continuum, not a switch,21 and all adolescents traverse the 
transition, from vulnerability and immaturity to autonomy and 
competence, at different speeds, meaning “any one teen … might not fit 
into the model.”22  
A more nuanced approach is to recognize that the competence of 
juveniles to meaningfully and responsibly consent to sex and resist 
sexual manipulation and coercion is dependent not only on the juvenile’s 
age, but also on contextual factors such as the relative ages of the sexual 
partners and the nature of the sexual activity in question. For example, in 
Consent to Sexual Relations, Professor Wertheimer notes the argument 
that 
…young females are more competent to navigate the 
world of adolescent/adolescent relationships than the 
world of adolescent/adult relationships. … [I]t is possible 
that the decision-making of young females is more likely 
to be distorted by transference or respect for authority or 
status seeking when they are contemplating relationships 
with older males, or that the risks consequent to 
adolescent/adolescent relationships are small compared 
with adolescent/adult relationships.23 
In this vein, most jurisdictions have abandoned the single age of consent 
approach24 in favor of age-gap reforms, which eliminate strict liability 
                                                                                                                         
 
222 (“conditions between adults and children preclude any sexual relationship that is not in some 
sense exploitative”). 
21 Joseph Fischel, Per Se or Power? Age and Sexual Consent, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 279, 
305 (2010) (“[T]here is enough sociological evidence that [a neurological moment when young 
people fully understand sex, their sexual choices, and the ramifications of sex acts] is illusory.”). 
22 Oliveri, supra note 11, 485; see, further, Susan Kuo, A Little Privacy, Please: Should We 
Punish Parents for Teenage Sex?, 89 KY. L.J. 135, 163 (2000-2001) (noting that the divergence in 
ages of consent from state to state is “evidence of this lack of consensus over the point at which a 
sexual relationship becomes harmful to one or both teens and the relative arbitrariness of any 
number”); Fischel, supra note 21, 305 (noting that “education, safer sex education, resources, gender, 
regional location, family dynamics, and politics all mediate, dampen, empower or in other ways give 
shape to a young person’s sexual agency and her ability to consent”). 
23 WERTHEIMER, supra note 8, 218-19. See, further, Fischel, supra note 21, 301 (noting 
“relations of power and dependency in young people’s lives that constrain consent’s transformative 
force”); Amer. Acad. of Fam. Physicians, et al., Protecting Adolescents: Ensuring Access to Care 
and Reporting Sexual Activity and Abuse, 35 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 420 (2004) (noting that an 
adolescent’s age and disparity in years between an adolescent and her sexual partner are key factors 
in determining whether health care providers should report the relationship to authorities as abusive); 
Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master’s House: Of Protection, Patriarchy and the Potential for 
Using the Master’s Tools to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Laws, 50 DEPAUL L. REV 799, 813 (2000) 
(hereinafter “Master’s House”) (noting that “it may be accurate to assume that the wider the age gap 
between partners, the greater the chance of coercion”). 
24 Only twelve states have a single age of consent, below which an individual cannot consent to 
sexual intercourse under any circumstances, and above which it is legal to engage in sexual 
intercourse with another person above the age of consent: see, generally, Annotation, Statute 
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for certain degrees of sexual contact between minors within certain 
specified age differentials.25 This approach attempts to leave space for 
normal adolescent sexuality and some degree of sexual autonomy and 
privacy, while also safeguarding against age-disparity-based power 
imbalances that may impact young people as they navigate their sexual 
development.26 
The age-gap approach indicates a shift in the legal response to 
adolescent sexuality, away from proscribing all adolescent sex per se.  
Instead, the focus turns to the prevention of potentially exploitative 
sexual relations, with age disparity functioning as a workable if 
imperfect proxy of inequality and thus coercion. 27  This does not 
necessarily indicate moral approval of premarital sex among close-in-age 
teenagers, but a prioritization of coercive sexual relations rather than sex 
per se as the primary punitive target of statutory rape laws. This reform 
trend is congruent with evidence more generally of growing societal 
acceptance of the reality of adolescent sexuality. For example, most 
states have decriminalized or ceased prosecuting fornication,28 and there 
is increasingly strong support for school-based sex education that goes 
beyond the “abstinence only” message.29 
 
                                                                                                                         
 
Protecting Minors in a Specified Age Range from Rape or Other Sexual Activity as Applicable to 
Defendant Minor Within Protected Age Group, 18 A.L.R.5th 856 (1994). 
25 See, e.g., TEXAS PENAL CODE § 21.11, “Indecency with a Child” (sexual contact with 
someone less than 17 years of age where the defendant is 3 or more years older than the victim). 
26 COCCA, supra note 2, 60 (“Age spans assume that an age difference in the teen years is rife 
with the potential for manipulation or abuse.”). 
27 Fischel, supra note 21, 311 (age-span reforms “aim at eliminating coercion, not sex”); 
COCCA, supra note 2, 19 (“Age acts as a proxy for a power differential that is suspect of coercion”); 
WERTHEIMER, supra note 8 (noting that wide age spans may not be “inherently coercive, [but] … 
might be a good proxy for coercion that is difficult to observe directly”). 
28 COCCA, supra note 2, 170 (noting that most states have taken their fornication statutes off 
the books); but see JoAnne Sweeny, Undead Statutes: The Rise, Fall, and Continuing Use of 
Adultery and Fornication Criminal Laws, 46 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO L. J. 127, 171 (2014) 
(noting that although fornication is “not routinely prosecuted”, such laws can still be enforced, and 
“juveniles are particularly vulnerable … because courts are more willing to overrule their asserted 
privacy rights”). Massachusetts, Virginia, Georgia, Idaho, Mississippi, North Carolina, Utah and 
South Carolina still have fornication offenses on the books 
(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/14/state-laws-women_n_4937387.html). 
29 Susan Wilson, Sexuality Education: Our Current Status, and an Agenda for 2010, 32(5) 
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 252, 253 (2000) (reporting that 80-90% 
of Americans favor courses that teach contraception and disease prevention in addition to abstinence; 
70% oppose federal funding for programs that prohibit teaching about condoms and contraceptives; 
and 69% say teaching abstinence until marriage is “just not realistic”). Seventy-five billion dollars in 
federal funding for school sexual abstinence education programs was passed in April 2015 
(https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2/text), however President Obama has cut 
funding for abstinence-only funding in his 2017 budget due to a lack of proven effectiveness 
(President Obama Cuts Funding for All Abstinence-Only Education, N.Y. TIMES WOMEN IN THE 
WORLD (Feb. 18, 2016), http://nytlive.nytimes.com/womenintheworld/2016/02/18/president-obama-
cuts-funding-for-all-abstinence-only-sex-education/).  
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III. THE USE OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS AGAINST MEMBERS OF 
THE PROTECTED CLASS 
Sex involving adolescents has been described as a “prominent 
bogeyman”, in that rates are lower than is commonly believed. 30 
Nonetheless, intercourse and other sexual acts are common among 
American youth, including among those who are legally unable to 
consent: ages of consent vary across jurisdictions from ten to eighteen, 
with sixteen being the most common;31 and about 20% of fifteen-year-
olds have had sex.32 Where a minor’s sexual partner is also a minor but 
sufficiently close in age, age-span provisions may eliminate liability for 
statutory rape, thereby removing conventionally consensual sex among 
peers from the reach of the law.33 However such “Romeo and Juliet” 
provisions34 often do not apply to sex among minors under a certain 
age;35 may reduce but not eliminate liability;36 and are not found in all 
jurisdictions.37 
In jurisdictions without applicable age-span provisions, and in the 
absence of a specified minimum age of defendant to confine the use of 
                                                      
 
30 Lawrence B. Finer and Jesse M. Philbin, Sexual Initiation, Contraceptive Use, and 
Pregnancy Among Young Adolescents, 131(5) PEDIATRICS 886, 887 (2013). 
31 65 AM. JUR. 2d, Rape, § 14.  
32 Finer and Philbin, supra note 30 (reporting that 19% of fifteen-year-old females have had 
sex; figures for young males are slightly higher). On the difficulties of obtaining reliable data 
pertaining to juvenile sexual activity, see Paul R. Abramson and Annaka Abramson, Smells Like 
Teen Spirit: The Conundrum of Kids, Sex, and the Law, in CHILDREN, SEXUALITY, AND THE LAW 1, 
2 (Sacha M. Coupet and Ellen Marrus eds., 2015). 
33 See, generally, Charles A. Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On Regulating Consensual Sexual 
Activity Between Teenagers, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 373, 390 (2002-2003). Nonconsensual 
sex could, of course, still be prosecuted by proving forcible rape: In re Kitt 129 Ore. App. 591 (1994) 
(finding that age-span statute provides a defense when the alleged lack of consent is based solely on 
incapacity due to the victim’s age, and is inapposite when there is an actual lack of consent). 
34 There is technically a difference between age-span provisions, which decriminalize sex 
between close-in-age minors, and “Romeo and Juliet” clauses, which provide an affirmative defense 
if the victim and offender are sufficiently close in age: see, generally, Danielle Flynn, All the Kids 
Are Doing It: The Unconstitutionality of Enforcing Statutory Rape Laws Against Children & 
Teenagers, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 681, 687-691 (2012). The terms are used interchangeably herein. 
35 In twenty-seven states, statutes specify a “minimum age of consent”, below which an 
adolescent cannot legally engage in sexual intercourse regardless of the age of the defendant: see, 
generally, Asaph Glosser et. al., Statutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws and Reporting Requirements, 
THE LEWIN GROUP 7 (2004); Kitrosser, supra note 14, 314 (noting that “age span provisions are 
generally limited to adolescents [and do not apply to] sexual activity with children below a certain 
pre-adolescent age”). See, e.g., OHIO REVISED CODE, § 2907.2 (engaging in sexual conduct with 
someone less than thirteen years of age where the defendant and victim are not married and living 
together). 
36 See, e.g., GEORGIA CODE, § 16-6-3 (statutory rape is considered a misdemeanor if the victim 
is 14 or 15 years of age and the defendant is no more than 3 years older). 
37 Glosser, supra note 35. See, e.g., WISCONSIN STATUTES ANNOTATED § 948.02 (individuals 
under the age of 16 are deemed incapable of consent under all circumstances); NEW HAMPSHIRE 
REVISED STATUTES § 632-A:3 (a child under 16 years of age is unable to consent to sexual 
intercourse with anyone other than his or her spouse). 
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statutory rape laws to adult defendants,38 minor-minor sexual activity can 
result in criminal prosecution or delinquency adjudication against one or 
both of the minors involved. This Section critically evaluates this use of 
statutory rape laws as a sword against a member of the class the laws 
were designed to shield. 
A number of commentators have persuasively argued that statutory 
rape proceedings are a disproportionate and unjust response to 
conventionally consensual39 sex among similarly situated adolescents, 
and that reforms should be implemented to exclude such sex from the 
scope of criminal and juvenile law.40 Such arguments are often premised 
on claims about constitutional privacy and substantive due process rights 
as they pertain to consensual sex among older teenagers.41 But the further 
we move away from the “charmed circle” of meaningfully consensual 
sex among similarly situated and sufficiently mature teens, the more 
controversial the issue of juvenile sex becomes. And the “protected class” 
question – whether laws designed as a shield can and should be used as a 
sword against that protected class – has received far less scrutiny in 
                                                      
 
38 See, e.g., In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301 (Vt. 2000) (holding that Vermont’s statutory rape laws are 
only applicable in cases where the defendant is at least 16 years of age); NEVADA REVISED 
STATUTES, § 200.364 (statutory sexual seduction of someone less than 16 years of age where the 
defendant is at least 18 years of age); but see § 201.230 (committing lewd or lascivious acts – not 
amounting to penetration – with someone less than 14 years of age with the intent of arousing, 
appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of the defendant or the victim; no 
minimum age of defendant). 
39 I use the term “conventionally consensual” to refer to voluntary and welcome participation in 
sexual activity (c.f. mere acquiescence), despite a lack of capacity to legally consent to sex. 
Voluntariness or actual consent is no defense to statutory rape, as minors are deemed legally unable 
to consent to sex. On the legal significance of voluntariness in relation to civil sexual harassment 
cases involving minor plaintiffs, see Jennifer Ann Drobac, Consent, Teenagers, and (un)Civil(ized) 
Consequences, in CHILDREN, SEXUALITY, AND THE LAW (Sacha M. Coupet and Ellen Marrus, eds., 
2015). 
40 See, e.g., Meredith Cohen, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 717 (2007-2008); Fischel, supra 
note 21, 300-8; Flynn, supra note 34; Jordan Franklin, Where Art Thou, Privacy?: Expanding 
Privacy Rights of Minors in Regard to Consensual Sex: Statutory Rape Laws and the Need for a 
“Romeo and Juliet” Exception in Illinois, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 209 (2012); Michele Goodwin, 
Law’s Limits: Regulating Statutory Rape Law, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 481, 530-531 (2013); Steve James, 
Romeo and Juliet Were Sex Offenders: An Analysis of the Age of Consent and a Call for Reform, 78 
UMKC L. REV. 241 (2009); Suzanne Meiners-Levy, Challenging the Prosecution of Young “Sex 
Offenders”: How Developmental Psychology and the Lessons of Roper Should Inform Daily 
Practice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 499 (2006); Siji A. Moore, Out of the Fire and Into the Frying Pan: 
Georgia Legislature’s Attempt to Regulate Teen Sex Through the Criminal Justice System, 52 
HOWARD L.J. 197, 229-230 (2008); Daryl J. Olszewski, Statutory Rape in Wisconsin: History, 
Rationale, and the Need for Reform, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 693 (2005); Lisa Pearlstein, Walking the 
Tightrope of Statutory Rape Law: Using International Legal Standards to Serve the Best Interests of 
Juvenile Offenders and Victims, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109 (2010); Phipps, supra note 33, 437-38 
(2002); Emily Stine, When Yes Means No, Legally: An Eighth Amendment Challenge to Classifying 
Consenting Teenagers as Sex Offenders, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1195-1207 (2010). 
41 See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Statutory Rape in a Post Lawrence v. Texas World, 58 S.M.U. L. 
REV. 77 (2005); Oliveri, supra note 11. 
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relation to “bad” and “wrongful” sex: sex involving children at the cusp 
of adolescence, sex that results in pregnancy or infection, and sex at the 
blurred margins between consent and nonconsent, voluntariness and 
coercion. This Section discusses constitutional and policy objections to 
the use of statutory rape laws against the protected class, even if the 
objective is to protect minors from harmful sex or sexual exploitation. 
 
A. Prosecuting Juvenile Sexual Partners for Consensual “Bad Sex” 
Obfuscates Fornication and Exploitation 
When Z.C. was thirteen years old, she had sex with a twelve-year-
old boy and became pregnant. 42  Utah takes a two-tier approach to 
statutory rape, meaning age-span provisions were only applicable to 
adolescents fourteen years and older. There were no Romeo and Juliet 
provisions applicable to offenders under the age of fourteen  (“children” 
under the statutory scheme). The state filed delinquency proceedings 
against both children for sexual abuse of a child. 43  The boy was 
adjudicated delinquent; Z.C. chose to fight the delinquency petition on 
constitutional grounds. 
As the Utah Court of Appeals noted, the proceedings against Z.C. 
and her sexual partner were ironic, in that they were deemed by law to be 
too young to consent to sex, yet were also deemed “able to form the 
intent to commit what would be a felony if committed by an adult”.44 
Nonetheless, the court reluctantly upheld the delinquency petition, 
finding that the lack of any age-span provision or mitigating factors 
applicable to “children” was rationally related to the legitimate 
legislative objective of “protecting the health and safety of young 
children, not only from older predators, but also from each other.”45 Z.C. 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The sexual contact in question was described, on appeal, as mutually 
welcome. In other words, although both Z.C. and her partner were 
legally unable to consent to intercourse, the sex was found to be 
conventionally consensual. 46  But are twelve- and thirteen-year-olds 
really capable of meaningfully consenting to sex, with all its emotional 
and developmental implications? The fact that pregnancy resulted would 
seem to indicate a lack of appreciation on the children’s part of the 
                                                      
 
42 State ex rel. Z.C., 163 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2007). 
43 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1(1)-(2) (2003) (prohibiting sexual contact with a child under 
the age of fourteen). 
44 State ex rel. Z.C. v State, 128 P.3d 561, f/n 6. Utah Code § 76-5-404.1 requires intent to 
cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to any person or intent to arouse or gratify the sexual 
desire of any person. 
45 Id, 566. 
46 State ex rel. Z.C. 163 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2007), note 1. 
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possible ramifications of their choices (although the same could be said 
of many intimate relationships among adults). Even apart from outcomes 
such as pregnancy, sexual activity among children aged thirteen, twelve 
or even younger evokes a different moral response to sex between, for 
example, two emotionally mature sixteen-year-olds who take responsible 
protective measures and look out for one another’s needs and interests. 
Clearly our tolerance for young love has its limits—at some point, 
Romeo and Juliet are considered too young for voluntary sex to be 
healthy, normal, socially desirable or safe. As Professor Wertheimer 
argues, 
[e]ven if B’s consent is given completely willingly and 
even if there is no deception, B’s token of consent is 
morally transformative only if she is suitably competent, 
that is, only if she has the requisite emotional and 
cognitive capacities. … [W]e can understand the need for 
these requirements in terms of both autonomy and utility. 
An agent’s age is autonomous or self-directing when she 
is motivated by her appreciation of the reasons provided 
by her situation. One who lacks certain cognitive or 
emotional capacities is not capable of making decisions 
consistent with those reasons. …[S]he may be unable to 
make choices that are consistent with her deepest values 
or preferences because those have not been formed…. 
From a utilitarian or “mutual benefit” account of 
consensual transactions, … when an agent’s cognitive 
and emotional capacities are impaired, we have less 
reason to assume that her decision will promote her 
interests.47 
In other words, sexual contact among children and young adolescents 
may be voluntary, but at some point of juvenility, it is not properly 
considered “good” sex. In that light, delinquency proceedings such as 
those brought against Z.C. may be an effective means of responding to 
concerning sexual behavior with guiding and reformative supervision. 
However, there are strong principle and policy objections to using 
statutory rape laws against consenting minors even in relation to “bad 
sex” where those minors are uncomfortably young or where sex results 
in bad outcomes such as impregnation of a thirteen-year-old.  
                                                      
 
47 WERTHEIMER, supra note 8, 215. 
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1. Harmful Sex is Not Necessarily Wrongful Sex 
First, as a preliminary point, it should be noted that if the sexual 
activity is noncoercive, mutually consensual or voluntary, and occurs in a 
context of equality, it is not properly characterized as exploitative.48 In 
other words, it does not involve victimization and there is no victim-
offender binary. Of course, children who become sexually active with 
other children at a young age may experience direct or indirect harm—
negative physical, psychological or emotional outcomes—as a result.49 In 
this sense, we might consider them to be victims of the sexual activity or 
“victims of harm”, but they are not, in the absence of exploitation, 
victims of another’s abuse or wrongdoing. 50  In other words, the fact that 
one or both children experience harm does not render the other a 
wrongful aggressor or victimizer.  
It is no answer to say that each is both victim and perpetrator in 
relation to the same act, or that each is a victim of the other.51 This either 
conflates “victim of harm” with “victim of wrongdoing”, or implies that 
there is such a thing as mutual sexual exploitation, which defies common 
sense.52 Further, as the Z.C. court reasoned, “it would be unthinkable to 
file even ‘civil’ juvenile court proceedings against a true victim of such a 
heinous crime.”53 In other words, even if children under a certain age are 
considered to lack the competence to meaningfully consent to sexual 
conduct, such that their voluntary sexual activity with one another can 
never be considered truly consensual, this presumed victimhood should 
also preclude treatment as victimizer.54 
                                                      
 
48 See infra at Part IV.A.1 (discussing exploitation as comprised of elements of inequality, 
coercion and (non)consent). 
49 Jones v State, 640 So.2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1994) (“[S]exual activity with a child opens the 
door to sexual exploitation, physical harm, and sometimes psychological damage.”). 
50 WERTHEIMER, supra note 8, 96 (noting the distinction between “A’s act harms B” and “A’s 
act exploits B”); R.A. Duff, Harms and Wrongs, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 13, 17 (2001) (arguing that 
“harm as a setback to interests…need not be wrongful”). On the question of pregnancy, sexually 
transmitted disease or loss of virginity as victimization, see infra at notes 122-126 and 
accompanying text. 
51 See, e.g., People v T.W., 291 Ill.App.3d 955, 960 (finding that “where … two minors engage 
in a consensual sexual act, the [statutory rape] statute may validly be applied to prosecute both 
minors on the basis that each is the victim of the other”); State v Colton M, 366 Wis.2d 119 (finding 
that “a juvenile under the [age of consent] could be both a victim and an offender under the 
[statutory rape] statute”). 
52 B.B. v State, 659 So.2d 256, 261 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan J. concurring) (noting that a reading of a 
statute that indicates both minors have committed the crime “effectively means each child was both 
aggressor and victim in a single act, which stretches credence to the breaking point”); In re 
Frederick, 622 N.E.2d 762, 765 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1993) (finding it would be absurd to charge two 
minors with the rape of the other). 
53 State ex rel. Z.C. 163 P.3d 1206, 1212 (Utah 2007) (concluding that “the State’s double 
prosecution of these children is best characterized as charging both as perpetrators for the same act”). 
54 Queen v Tyrell, 1 Q.B. 710 (1893) (holding that a person for whose protection an offence has 
been created cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting a person who commits the offence against 
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2. Statutory Rape Laws Should Be Confined to Wrongful Sex 
To Preserve Their Moral Authority and To Avoid Labeling 
Fornicators as Abusers 
The use of age of consent laws against two conventionally 
consenting minors is thus properly characterized as a punitive response 
to sex per se, not abusive sex. 55  As the Utah Supreme Court said in 
dismissing Z.C.’s delinquency petition, where a sex abuse statute is 
applied to two consenting minors, “there is no discernible victim [of 
abuse] that the law seeks to protect, only culpable participants that the 
State seeks to punish”.56 Such applications are objectionable for two 
reasons. First, sexual exploitation and fornication are distinct ethical 
breaches. 57  The former involves victimization and violates an 
uncontested moral norm: do not abuse the relative vulnerability of 
another for your own sexual gratification. By contrast, fornication is a 
victimless58 and contested moral breach.59 As society becomes more 
accommodating of adolescent autonomy and privacy interests, statutory 
rape laws are typically understood and justified as a necessary incursion 
on those interests in order to protect young persons from sexual 
exploitation.60 To use such laws to target fornication implies moral 
                                                                                                                         
 
her), cited in Robert H. Wood, The Failure of Sexting Criminalization: A Plea for the Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Restraint, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 150, 171 (2009) (arguing that “the 
class of persons a statute is meant to protect should not be subject to punishment under the statute”). 
C.f. People v T.W., 291 Ill.App.3d 955, 962  (holding that T.W., a minor, who had conventionally 
consensual sex with another minor, “relinquished his right to protection and was subject to 
prosecution [for statutory rape]” once he “assumed the status of an accused”). 
55 COCCA, supra note 2, 167 (arguing that the prosecution of same-age consensual adolescent 
relationships “illuminates what may be the substantive purpose of statutory rape laws, … often 
obscured with rhetoric about protecting the young and vulnerable, and that is to discourage 
nonmarital sexuality”); Fischel, supra note 21, 300 (“Criminalizing sexual activity among minors 
condemns sex, not coercion….”).  
56 State ex rel. Z.C. 163 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2007) (finding that the application of the statute to ZC 
for mutually welcome sex with another child produced an absurd result not intended by the 
legislature.) Of course, the question of whether sex is meaningfully consensual is not always 
straightforward – see infra at Part II.B (discussing the use of statutory rape laws against minors to 
target exploitative sex involving coercion or nonconsent, and the issue of borderline/gray cases). 
57 Id., 1212 (noting that fornication “differs from sexual assault crimes…in both theory and 
degree of punishment. Rather than punishing an actor who has perpetrated a crime against a victim, 
these laws demonstrate the legislature’s disapproval of the acts of both participants for violating a 
moral standard. Because these crimes do not involve a victim, they involve a lesser degree of 
punishment”). 
58 In the sense of “victim as one who is wronged” c.f. “victim as one who is harmed”. As 
discussed above, fornication may result in harm to one or both of the minors involved; this does not 
mean one or both minors were exploited/wronged. 
59 Supra at notes 9–13 – although a majority of Americans consider premarital teenage sex to 
be morally wrong, this rhetoric intersects with sex positivity discourse, and there is increasing 
recognition that sex can be a healthy aspect of maturation into adulthood. 
60  See, e.g., FRANKLIN ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO 
ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING, 125-6 (2004) (arguing that the “justification for adult 
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equivalence between fornication and exploitation, sex per se and sexual 
abuse, bad (morally unworthy) sex and wrongful (morally impermissible) 
sex. This dilutes the stigma and moral authority of statutory rape laws.61 
In other words, the role of sexual abuse laws is properly protective, 
rather than proscriptive of a moral standard. Statutory rape laws should 
therefore be confined to targeting the specific ethical breach of 
exploitation, not merely sex that a prosecutor (rightly or wrongly) 
considers morally unworthy.62 
Second, there are serious consequences for juvenile offenders who 
are labeled “child abuser” as opposed to “fornicator”. As the court in Z.C. 
noted, “labeling [a minor] with the moniker of ‘child abuser’, even 
within the juvenile court system, can have serious consequences” 
including life-long sex offender registration, severe social stigmatization 
                                                                                                                         
 
punishment – the exploitation of the young – is missing from settings in which both participants are 
young”); Sutherland, supra note 15, 315 (noting that “the justification usually put forward for age of 
consent laws is the protection of young persons from sexual exploitation by adults”); Cohen, supra 
note 40, 723 (2007-2008) (“[S]tatutory rape laws are absolutely imperative to protect minors from 
sexual predators.”). See, further, infra note 107 and accompanying text: prosecutors typically 
confine statutory rape proceedings to cases involving suspected exploitation, nonconsent or coercion. 
C.f. People v T.W. 291 Ill.App.3d 955 (1997) (finding that closeness in age of minor statutory rape 
defendant and his consenting partner did not override legislature’s purpose in enacting the statute, 
which was to protect thirteen- to sixteen-year-olds from engaging in premature sexual behavior 
regardless of their partners’ age); In re James P., 115 Cal.App.3d 681 (1981) (statutory rape statute 
was “enacted primarily to protect children from those influences which would tend to cause them to 
become involved in idle or immoral conduct”). 
61 Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 
HARV. L.REV. 904, 910 (1962) (cited in In re G.T. 758 A.2d 301) (arguing that laws that “purport to 
bring within the condemnation of the criminal statute kinds of activities whose moral neutrality, if 
not innocence, is widely recognized … raise basic issues of a morally acceptable criminal code”); In 
re Frederick, 622 NE.2d 762, 763 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1993) (finding that prosecution of 14-year-old 
juvenile for consensual sex with 12-year-old “victim” would “belittle…the legitimate suffering of 
other rape victims”). A similar argument could be made in relation to prosecuting consensual 
“sexting” among teenagers as child pornography: see, generally, Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, 
When Sex and Cell Phones Collide: Inside the Prosecution of a Teen Sexting Case, 32 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L. J. 1, 24-25 (2009). 
62 My argument does not necessarily implicate statutory rape as applied to adult-minor sex—
where conventionally consensual adult-minor sex is deemed exploitative due to the fact that one 
participant is an adult, a legal fiction that is widely accepted as an important means of protecting 
minors from predatory adults—but it is congruent with calls for close-in-age exceptions in relation to 
such sexual encounters to try to exclude non-abusive sex from the scope of statutory rape 
prosecutions generally. On the question of whether statutory rape law as applied to adult-minor sex 
should be reformed to incorporate a consent-based standard that better confines the focus to coercive, 
as opposed to consensual, sex, see, generally, Kitrosser, supra note 14 (arguing that simple age-
based restrictions on sex with minors obfuscate any meaningful inquiry into consent, coercion and 
power imbalances); Lewis Bossing, Now Sixteen Could Get You Life: Statutory Rape, Meaningful 
Consent, and the Implications for Federal Sentence Enhancement, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1205 (1998) 
(arguing that courts should consider whether a teen gave meaningful consent to an adult sex partner 
by analyzing the nature of the relationship between the parties and the nature of the sexual 
encounter); c.f. Olivieri, supra note 19, 482; Oberman, Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into 
Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 68-70 
(1994). 
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and loss of reputation.63 Accordingly, the use of sex abuse statutes as a 
response to mere fornication is disproportionate and arguably constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment.64  
In short, if the criminal law seeks to proscribe a moral standard by 
targeting non-exploitative but potentially harmful or morally proscribed 
behavior such as consensual fornication among younger minors, 
protective sexual abuse offenses, which presuppose a perpetrator and a 
victim,65 are not the appropriate tool.66 
                                                      
 
63 State ex rel. Z.C. 163 P.3d 1206, 1213 (Utah 2007). See, further, In re J.L. 800 N.W.2d 720 
(2011) (Retired Justice Meierhenry concurring specially) (noting the severe consequences of 
labeling a fourteen-year-old who had consensual sex with his twelve-year-old girlfriend a sex 
offender for life, arguing that those consequences “are far afield from the intended purpose of a 
juvenile petition of affording guidance, control, and rehabilitation” and that “branding this child a 
rapist and life-long sex offender almost assures he cannot succeed as a productive juvenile or adult”); 
In re B.A.M., 806 A.2d 893, 895 (2002) (noting the penalties for violation by a juvenile of a statutory 
rape statute “are severe…and the nature of the crime is one which, at the very least, reflects badly on 
the character of the offender”); Catherine L. Carpenter, Against Juvenile Sex Offender Registration, 
82 U. CIN. L. REV. 747 (2014) (arguing that juvenile sex offender registration is cruel and unusual 
punishment); PHIL RICH, UNDERSTANDING, ASSESSING AND REHABILITATING JUVENILE SEXUAL 
OFFENDERS, 2ND ED. (2011), 24 (“When it comes to labeling a child or adolescent as a sexual 
offender or its softer counterpart, a sexually abusive youth, we should be careful. The very same 
behaviors in adults and juveniles may be distinguished from one another by situation, circumstances, 
and developmental age and experience, as well as by intent, depth of comprehension and … moral 
implication”); Human Rights Watch, Raised on the Registry: The Irreparable Harm of Placing 
Children on Sex Offender Registries (2013), at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0513_ForUpload_1.pdf; Illinois Juvenile Justice 
Commission, Improving Illinois’ Response to Sexual Offenses Committed by Youth – 
Recommendations for Law, Policy, and Practice (March 2014), 38-50 and 72-76. The question of 
whether juveniles should ever be subject to sex offender registration is beyond the scope of this 
Article; see, generally, CAMILLE GIBSON AND DONNA M. VANDIVER, JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS: 
WHAT THE PUBLIC NEEDS TO KNOW (2008), 70-71, 184-92; Elizabeth Garfinkle, Coming of Age in 
America: The Misapplication of Sex-Offender Registration and Community-Notification Laws to 
Juveniles, 91 CAL. L. REV. 163 (2003); Elizabeth J. Letourneau and Michael F. Caldwell, Expensive, 
Harmful Policies that Don’t Work or How Juvenile Sexual Offending is Addressed in the U.S., INT. J. 
OF BEHAVIORAL CONSULTATION & THERAPY 8(3) (2013); In the interest of J.B., 2014 WL 7369785 
(Pa. 2014) (finding that mandatory lifelong sex offender registration as applied to juveniles is 
unconstitutional); In re. C.P. 967 N.E.2d 729, 732 (Ohio 2012) (finding lifetime registration for 
juveniles constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). 
64 B.B. v State, 659 So.2d 256, 261 (Fla. 1995) (Harding J dissenting, dicta) (“If B.B. is 
adjudicated delinquent of a second-degree felony, he may have an argument that the particular 
sanction imposed upon him for having sex with another sixteen-year-old is cruel and unusual 
punishment.”); Re Pima County Juvenile Appeal 790 P.2d 723 (noting petitioner’s policy argument 
that it is “unfair to brand innocent teenage behavior as criminal”, and acknowledging that the 
“present statute could lead to a harsh result in a given case”). See, generally, Flynn, supra note 40, 
694-97. 
65 State ex rel. Z.C., 163 P.3d 1206, 1211 (Utah 2007) (“…like all forms of sexual assault, child 
sex abuse presupposes that a single act of abuse involves a victim, whom the statute endeavors to 
protect, and a perpetrator, whom the statute punishes for harming the victim”). 
66 Id., 1212 (noting that delinquency proceedings against Z.C. under statutory rape provisions 
“beg the question of why the prosecutor could not have accomplished the intended result by basing 
the delinquency petition on a victimless offense that more accurately fits the conduct at issue”); In re 
B.A.M., 806 A.2d 893, 897-8 (2002) (finding statutory rape statutes were “designed to protect 
children from exploitation by their elders”, that it would be absurd to prosecute consensual sexual 
activity between minors, and that the “law was not intended to render criminal per se the 
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3. Prosecutorial Discretion Is Not An Adequate Means of 
Confining Statutory Rape to Wrongful Adolescent Sex 
Cases involving statutory rape proceedings in relation to sex among 
conventionally consenting, similarly situated minors appear to be rare, 
although at least one court has said that statutory rape laws can be used 
against both minors for consensual sex “on the basis that each is a victim 
                                                                                                                         
 
experimentation carried on by young children, even where the acts may evoke disapprobation or 
censure”). C.f. State v J.A.S., 686 So.2d 1366 (1997 Fla. App.) (holding minors could be prosecuted 
for statutory rape in relation to consensual sex, and that “the crux of the state’s interest in the minor-
to-minor situation is in protecting the minor from the sexual activity itself for reasons of health and 
quality of life”); Re Pima County Juvenile Appeal, 790 P.2d 723 (1990) (“We are persuaded that the 
state has a significant interest in proscribing sexual conduct between minors.”); In re Hildebrant, 
548 N.W.2d 715 (1996) (finding that prosecution of fourteen-year-old girl for conventionally 
consensual sex with her thirteen-year-old adopted brother did not violate the policy behind the 
statutory rape-type statute, which “has its basis in the presumption that the children’s immaturity and 
innocence prevents them from appreciating the full magnitude and consequences of their conduct”); 
People v T.W., 291 Ill.App.3d 955 (finding the purpose of the statutory rape statute was “to protect 
children … from the consequences of premature sexual experiences”); Cote H v Eighth Judicial Dist. 
Court, 175 P.3d 906 (Nev. 2008) (finding that liberally construing statutory rape statute to permit 
minors under the age of consent to be adjudicated delinquent is consistent with that statute’s purpose 
“to protect minors from others’ lewd acts”); In re P.M., 592 A.2d 862 (Vt. 1991) (declining to read a 
minimum age limit for perpetrators into the statutory rape law).  
A legal age of consent may be intended to serve an aspirational or morally-prescriptive 
function, sending a message that sexual activity among juveniles below a certain age is not socially 
acceptable (Kadish, supra note 61, 914 (“one of [the] central purposes [of criminal law is] as a 
solidifier and communalizer of moral values”). This function could equally be served by fornication 
laws that criminalize all consensual sex among minors. The question of whether this is an 
appropriate function of criminal and juvenile law is beyond the scope of this Article, although I take 
the position that potentially harmful sex among minors that does not involve exploitation is best 
addressed with non-criminal policies or diversion programs, rather than by criminalizing fornication 
among adolescents, for at least two practical reasons. First, because of the difficulty of enforcing 
fornication laws uniformly (due to the sheer number of adolescents who are sexually active: supra 
note 32) and fairly (discussed herein at notes 76-78 and accompanying text; see, further, Kadish, 
supra note 61, 911-13 (discussing the potential for “arbitrary and abusive law enforcement” where 
legislation prohibits consensual extramarital sexual behavior)). Second, because of the difficulty in 
defining a cut-off age at which juvenile privacy and autonomy interests should be trumped by the 
state’s interest in proscribing a moral standard and protecting juveniles from the harms of premature 
sexual activity: see, generally B.B. v State, 659 So.2d 256 (finding application of statutory rape law 
to sixteen-year-old for consensual sex with another sixteen-year-old was unconstitutional under 
constitutional right of privacy); Flynn, supra note 40, 697 (arguing that “since society has come to 
acknowledge the fact that teenagers engage in sexual activity, the punishment of such activity 
becomes not only moot, but also contrary to societal interests”); Fischel, supra note 21, 300 (arguing 
that “criminalizing sexual activity among minors condemns sex, not coercion; dampens the sexual 
autonomy of young people; and disrespects their choices. If many or most young people are first 
having sex while below the age of consent, our social and legal obligation is not to penalize the 
sex—making it more difficult for teenagers to report coercion—but to protect young people’s 
choices, desires and safety. We fail this obligation if we criminalize teenagers for having sex”). On 
the constitutionality of using fornication statutes to regulate teenage sex, see, generally, Martin R. 
Gardner, The Categorical Distinction between Adolescents and Adults: The Supreme Court’s 
Juvenile Punishment Cases – Constitutional Implications for Regulating Teenage Sexual Activity, 28 
B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1 (2013); Loewy, supra note 41. 
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of the other.”67  More commonly, and given the prevalence of sexual 
activity among American teenagers below the age of consent, 68 
prosecutorial discretion is exercised to exclude sexual activity among 
adolescents from the reach of legal regulation unless it appears to be 
exploitative.69 However, there are numerous problems with relying on 
prosecutorial discretion alone to so confine the scope of statutory rape 
laws. First, the Z.C. case and others show that prosecutorial discretion is 
not a fail-proof safeguard. 70  Second, even laws that are enforced 
infrequently may be used as threats again juveniles.71 Third, the lack of 
clarity as to whether consensual sex among minors is a proper target of 
statutory rape laws also produces uncertainty for both minors72 and 
                                                      
 
67 People v T.W., 291 Ill.App.3d 955, 960. See, further, Michael Caldwell, What We Do Not 
Know About Juvenile Sexual Reoffense Risk, 7 CHILD MALTREATMENT 291, 292 (2002) (noting that 
“adjudication of noncoerced peer teen sexual activity is apparently not widespread” but “is fairly 
common in at least one state [Wisconsin]”). 
68 Supra notes 31-32. 
69 Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 9, 750-1 (noting “an apparent consensus 
among prosecutors against enforcement of statutory rape laws in cases of “consensual sexual 
relationships” among peers, and concluding that “statutory rape laws currently are enforced at the 
margins, rather than in the main. The bulk of the statutory rape docket consists of cases in which 
society is likely to view the predator as “sick,” rather than simply lovelorn, and cases that arguably 
could be tried as forcible rape”); Phipps, supra note 33, 401 (“If there is no evidence of coercion or 
other wrongful conduct, prosecutors simply do not have the resources (or the inclination) to 
prosecute … cases [involving voluntary sex between teenagers].”); Re Pima County Juvenile Appeal 
790 P.2d 723 (1990) (“[T]he state conceded in oral argument that it does not attempt to apply § 13-
1404 [prohibiting sexual contact with a person under fifteen years of age] to all juveniles who violate 
it, nor does it intend to.”); Gail Ryan, Sexually Abusive Youth: Defining the Problem and the 
Population, in JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDING: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CORRECTION 3, 4 
(Gail Ryan and Sandy Lane eds., 2nd ed., 1997) (“In most cases, activities with willing similar-aged 
peers were only charged as “statutory” crimes if a complaint was made.”); In re G.T. 758 A.2d 301, 
306 (noting that the state’s attorney “receives numerous complaints to prosecute teenagers under 
[statutory rape provision], usually from parents, but does so only when there is evidence of coercion 
or a lack of consent”); Sandy Nowack, A Community Prosecution Approach to Statutory Rape: 
Wisconsin’s Pilot Policy Project, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 865, 873-74 (2000); Kay L. Levine, The 
Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 
55 EMORY L. J. 691 (2006). 
70 State ex rel. Z.C. 163 P.3d 1206, 1212 (Utah 2007) (noting that “the primary fail-safe against 
the absurd application of criminal law is the wise employment of prosecutorial discretion, a quality 
that is starkly absent in this case”). See, further, In re B.A.M., 806 A.2d 893 (2002) (finding 
application of a “deliberately protective [statutory rape statute] specifically intended by the 
Legislature to shield young children from sexual predation by older teenagers and adults” to 11-year-
old for sex with another 11-year-old produced an absurd result); Megan Twohey, Teens Who Have 
Sex Charged With Abuse: DAS Prosecuting Even When Both Consent, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
Mar. 8, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 4714641; Jamaal Abdul-Alim, Teens Have Right to Have 
Sex, Lawyer Argues, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 21, 2003 (reporting proceedings against two 
fourteen-year-old juveniles for attempted sexual assault, following the girl’s mother finding the pair 
in bed about to have sexual intercourse). For a fascinating socio-legal study of how prosecutors in 
California individually and collectively develop standards to define the meaning of exploitation in 
the statutory rape caseload, see Levine, supra note 69, 713-32. 
71 Oliveri, supra note 11, 505. 
72 Meiners-Levy, supra note 40, 512 (arguing that given society’s acceptance of preteen and 
teenage sex, “there is little reason for a teenager to believe that sexual contact can lead to 
prosecution absent specific familiarity with the law”). 
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mandatory reporters,73 and may produce a chilling effect in terms of 
teens’ willingness to seek guidance about relationships, pregnancy, 
sexual health and child support from their elders.74 Fourth, Professor 
Levine points out that to the extent that prosecutors attempt to use 
statutory rape laws sparingly, to target only cases involving exploitation, 
this insulates the law’s technical condemnation of all sex involving 
minors, including non-abusive and meaningfully consensual sex among 
members of the protected class, from “meaningful public critique”.75  
Finally, a criminal code that theoretically allows for the punishment 
of consensual sex between minors as statutory rape, but relies on 
prosecutorial discretion to ensure sex per se is not the punitive target, can 
too easily lead to selective punishment of juvenile fornication as 
statutory rape based on prosecutorial judgments about when consensual, 
non-abusive sex is morally unworthy. Not only is “bad sex” not the 
appropriate target of statutory rape laws, but this also raises equal 
protection issues for juveniles whose sexuality lies outside the “charmed 
circle” of “normal, natural, blessed” sexuality 76 —for example, 
adolescents in institutional settings77 or non-heterosexual youth78—and 
may accordingly be disproportionately targeted.79 
                                                      
 
73 In re G.T. 758 A.2d 301, 306 (Vt. 2000); see, further, Planned Parenthood Affiliates of 
California v Van de Kamp, 181 Cal.App.3d 245 (1986) (commenting dicta that it is “illogical” to 
definitively apply child abuse statute to voluntary sexual conduct among minors under the specified 
age limit; finding that reporting of voluntary non-abusive behavior of sexually active minors violates 
right to sexual privacy guaranteed mature minors by California Constitution). 
74 Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 9, 743 (arguing that “it is the height of 
foolishness to deter a teen from seeking contraception, treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, 
prenatal care, or food for their infant”). 
75 Levine, supra note 69, 744-45. 
76 Supra at notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
77 Zimring, supra note 60 (noting that “consensual ‘status offenders’ are seldom prosecuted 
except in institutional settings such as group homes – a double standard with potentially lifelong 
legal consequences”); Meiners-Levy, supra note 40, 502 (noting that “the children most likely to be 
targeted in prosecutions for consensual sexual encounters that violate the law because of the age of 
both the victim and the “perpetrator” are children already involved in the juvenile justice or child 
welfare systems”). 
78 For discussion of bias against homosexual youths in Romeo and Juliet exceptions and 
statutory rape enforcement generally, see COCCA, supra note 2, 10 (noting that there is “some 
evidence that prosecutions under [statutory rape] laws have disproportionately targeted homosexual 
relationships”); Michael H. Meidinger, Peeking Under the Covers: Taking a Closer Look at 
Prosecutorial Decision-Making Involving Queer Youth and Statutory Rape, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. 
JUST. 421 (2012) (arguing that queer youth may be more vulnerable to statutory rape prosecutions 
based on their “failure to fit social norms”); Caitlyn Silhan, The Present Case Does Involve Minors: 
An Overview of the Discriminatory Effects of Romeo and Juliet Provisions and Sentencing Practices 
on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth, 20 LAW & SEXUALITY REV. LESBIAN GAY 
BISEXUAL & LEGAL ISSUES 97, 109 (2011); Michael J. Higdon, Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies: 
The Cruel and Invidious Discrimination Behind Heterosexist Statutory Rape Laws, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 195 (2008) (discussing statutory rape schemes that limit Romeo and Juliet exceptions to 
heterosexual conduct); Sutherland, supra note 21, 327-28; Commonwealth v Washington W., 9238 
N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 2010) (seeking discovery to prove selective enforcement of statutory rape laws 
based on sexual orientation); Fischel, supra note 21, 301 (arguing that “insofar as age of consent 
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B. Use of Statutory Rape Laws To Target Undefined Victimization 
(Wrongful Sex) Within the Protected Class is Unduly Subjective 
The Z.C. court limited its holding to “situations where no true victim 
or perpetrator can be identified.”80 This points to the more common use 
of statutory rape laws against members of the protected class: one-sided 
prosecution of the “true offender”. 
Sex among minors may involve predatory power dynamics or 
outright exploitation and abuse. As sexual creatures, juveniles are 
capable of exploiting the relative vulnerability of others for their own 
sexual gratification.81 Studies have shown that some child molesters 
begin abusing children as juveniles.82 It is obviously important that the 
law responds to the grave harm inflicted on children who are sexually 
abused whether by adults or by other minors,83 and to intervene with 
rehabilitative measures when a juvenile shows such predatory 
proclivities.84 Even sex among adolescents that at first glance appears to 
be conventionally consensual may on closer examination involve 
elements of undue persuasion or emotional manipulation.85 As discussed 
above, such exploitative sex is properly considered wrongful or morally 
impermissible, as distinct from merely bad or morally unworthy.86 
B.A.H. was fourteen when his male cousin and best friend, thirteen-
year-old X.X., slept over.87 The boys consumed alcohol at B.A.H.’s 
urging, and B.A.H. initiated a sexual encounter involving oral and anal 
intercourse. Some time after X.X. told him to stop, B.A.H. stopped. He 
told X.X. he would kill him if he told anyone about what had happened, 
                                                                                                                         
 
statutes are and have been disproportionately enforced against black men and gay men, criminal law 
in the areas of sexual proscriptions and sentencing is more plausibly rendered as a conduit and 
codification of racism and homophobia”). 
79 See infra at notes 100-103 and accompanying text. 
80 State ex rel. Z.C. 163 P.3d 1206, 1213 (Utah 2007). See, also, Commonwealth v Bricker, 41 
A.3d 872, 880 (clarifying that the holding in In re B.A.M., if worded more precisely, “would have 
strictly [been] limited … to its facts wherein mutually agreed upon sexual activity between peers 
under the age of 13 is not a crime”). 
81  See, generally, GAIL RYAN AND SANDY LANE, JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDING (1997); 
GIBSON AND VANDIVER, supra note 63. 
82  Gail Ryan, The Evolving Response to Juvenile Sexual Offenses, in JUVENILE SEXUAL 
OFFENDING 179, 180 (Gail Ryan and Sandy Lane eds., 1997). 
83  P.G. v State, 616 S.W.2d 635 (Tex.Civ.App.1981) (“Children are entitled to no less 
protection from other children who sexually abuse them than they are from adults who sexually 
abuse them.”). 
84 Ryan, supra note 82, 180 (noting that “until recent years, juveniles engaging in behaviors 
that were clearly both sexual and criminal were often dismissed with a ‘boys will be boys’ attitude or 
a slap on the hand by parents, teachers, and judges alike”). 
85See, generally, Oberman, supra note 62, 58.  
86 Supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
87 In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158 (Minnesota 2014). 
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which X.X. took to be “more like an exaggeration” based on B.A.H.’s 
fear of being “outed as bi”. When X.X. told his mother, some months 
later, about the encounter, she took him to a counselor, a mandated 
reporter, who disclosed the allegations to the police. B.A.H. was charged 
with statutory rape.88 Both B.A.H. and X.X. were under the relevant age 
of consent, which was sixteen years. 
Many features of the encounter between B.A.H. and X.X. are 
troubling. B.A.H. was an (admittedly only slightly) older cousin of X.X., 
which may have influenced the power dynamics of their relationship—
X.X. said that he “didn’t want to do it” but that “[B.A.H.] convinced me 
because he’s my favorite cousin” and X.X. “didn’t want to feel 
like…being mean”.89 In addition, B.A.H. supplied the alcohol that likely 
impacted the judgment, capacity and inhibitions of both the boys; failed 
to stop at X.X.’s command; and threatened X.X. after the fact. Even on 
the brevity of facts found in the judgment, a reasonable observer might 
infer victimization of X.X. by B.A.H.; that this was not “just sex”, but 
sex that crossed the line from fornication to abuse. Indeed, the court 
found that the encounter between B.A.H. and X.X. reflected “an almost 
archetypal perpetrator and victim of criminal sexual conduct”, and 
upheld B.A.H.’s delinquency adjudication. 90  Nonetheless, there are 
serious problems with applying strict liability statutory rape laws to 
sexual contact between members of the same protected class, even in 
cases like that of B.A.H. where the intended punitive target is wrongful 
exploitation of a minor by a minor. 
1. The Punitive Target is Not Defined 
The objectionable conduct as defined by a statutory rape statute is 
sex with a minor.91 When an adult has sex with a minor, the adult alone 
has engaged in the prohibited conduct and the minor is deemed a 
victim.92 When two minors engage in sexual contact, each has satisfied 
the elements of statutory rape and each is legally a violator, whether or 
                                                      
 
88 MINN. STAT. § 609.342.1(g) ([a] person who engaged in sexual penetration with another 
person … is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if … the actor has a significant 
relationship to the complainant and the complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the 
sexual penetration. … [C]onsent to the act by the complainant is [not] a defense”). 
89 In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 161. 
90 Id., 166. 
91 65 AM. JUR. 2d, Rape, § 13 (“The elements of statutory rape are merely sexual intercourse 
with a person under the age of consent.”). 
92 There may be cases of adult-minor sexual contact where the minor, deemed by statutory rape 
law to be a victim, is in fact the “true offender” vis-à-vis the separate offense of forcible rape. See 
Russell Christopher and Kathryn Christopher, The Paradox of Statutory Rape, 87 IND. L.J. 505 
(2012) (discussing how an adult rape victim, raped by a sexually aggressive minor below the age of 
consent, is exposed to statutory rape liability). 
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not there was de facto exploitation or harm.93 In cases like B.A.H., 
prosecutorial discretion is exercised to target victimization of the “true” 
victim by the “true” offender and the statute is enforced accordingly.94 
The difficulty with this approach is that it is vague and subjective, 
because in the context of sex among members of the protected class, 
victimhood is not defined. Instead, it is left to prosecutors to define the 
punitive target of statutory rape laws as applied to sex among minors, be 
it nonconsensual sex, coercion, incest, loss of virginity, impregnation, 
fornication or some other notion of bad or wrongful sex. Accordingly, 
prosecutorial beliefs about the normative boundary between good, bad 
and wrongful sex can significantly influence the regulation of sex among 
adolescents and whose conduct is legally sanctioned.95 Phipps gives the 
following illustration: 
[O]ne county prosecutor may believe that all voluntary 
sex between teenagers is wrong and vigorously prosecute 
                                                      
 
93 The State in B.A.H. conceded that both boys were similarly situated in relation to the statute: 
In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 165. This would not be true in a case where one minor was a 
completely passive participant, due to the absence of a voluntary act. 
94 The court found the decision to charge B.A.H. and not X.X. was rational because the 
encounter between B.A.H. and X.X. reflected “an almost archetypal perpetrator and victim of 
criminal sexual conduct”: In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 166 (Minnesota 2014). See, further, Justice 
Page’s concurrence, 167 (“[The argument that X.X. also committed criminal sexual conduct] cannot 
go unchallenged because it harkens back to a day when sexual assault victims were considered as 
culpable as the perpetrators of such assaults.”); State ex rel. Z.C. 163 P.3d 1206, 1213 (Utah 2007) 
(finding that statutory rape law as applied to 13-year-old female juvenile who engaged in “mutually 
welcome” sexual intercourse with 12-year-old boy, produced absurd result not intended by 
legislature, but confining holding to “situations where no true victim or perpetrator can be 
identified”); In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio 2011) (noting “the temptation for prosecutors to label 
one child as the offender and the other child as the victim” in relation to sex within the protected 
class). 
95 See Kadish, supra note 61, 909-911 (cited in In re G.T. 758 A.2d 301) (arguing that laws 
that “seem deliberately to over-criminalize, in the sense of encompassing conduct not the target of 
legislative concern…are in effect equivalent to enactments of a broad legislative policy against, for 
example, undesirable gambling, leaving it to the police to further that policy by such arrests as seem 
to them compatible with it. From one point of view such statutes invite a danger cognate to that of 
defining a crime by analogy, augmented by the fact that it is the policeman who is defining criminal 
conduct rather than a court. That no actual abuse has been demonstrated in police administration of 
an overdrawn statute, such as gambling, would not seem to answer the moral and precedential 
objections to this tactic.”); Michelle Oberman, Two Truths and a Lie: In re John Z. and Other Stories 
at the Juncture of Teen Sex and the Law, 38(2) L. & SOCIAL INQUIRY 364, 395 (“[D]istrict attorneys’ 
offices serve as factories in which the criminal law meets the reality of limited resources and the 
“real” crimes become articulated.”); Justice Dooley, dissenting, in In re P.M., 592 A.2d 862 (Vt. 
1991) (arguing that whether behavior contravenes a statutory rape provision should turn on “the type 
of conduct involved, not on an ad hoc balancing of the relative positions of the parties or on indicia 
of some unspecified level of exploitation”); Phipps, supra note 33, 417 (arguing in relation to 
statutory rape provisions that “[i]f something other than the act of sexual intercourse is the 
objectionable conduct (e.g. use of coercion), then that conduct must be defined [or the] crime 
becomes pliable and ever-changing”); Oliveri, supra note 11, 503-504 (discussing the risk of 
statutory rape laws being used “as a vehicle for a particular prosecutor’s political or social agenda”, 
and giving examples of the use of anti-fornication and cohabitation laws to target welfare recipients 
and welfare fraud). 
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all cases brought to her attention. A prosecutor in an 
adjoining county, however, might create a per se rule that 
any time a victim says “no,” such cases are always 
prosecuted. And yet another county prosecutor may 
decide to prosecute only cases in which the female makes 
a prompt outcry and immediately tells a third party that 
sex was coerced. Thus, rather than deciding which 
offense to apply to given conduct, the prosecutor would 
be…defining crimes on a case-by-case basis rather than 
on the basis of objective criteria established by a state 
legislature.96 
Thus even assuming good-faith efforts are made to exclude mere 
fornication from the scope of statutory rape laws as applied to minor 
defendants, the true crime of “victimization” or “exploitation” is not 
defined. In other words, as applied to minor-minor sex, statutory rape 
statutes are so over-inclusive that it is left to prosecutors to define the 
scope of illegal minor-minor exploitation. Should pregnancy always be 
considered to constitute victimization of a female by a male?97 What 
about when a parent complains about their child’s loss of chastity, or 
involvement with a same-sex peer?98 Such a flexible approach to minor-
minor sex is objectionable as a matter of policy, because the question of 
how society should respond to adolescent sexuality, and the proper limits 
of law’s tolerance thereof, is a complex and controversial policy matter 
that should not be left to prosecutorial predilection but should be 
confronted, as far as possible, with statutory clarity.99  
                                                      
 
96 Phipps, supra note 33, 413. 
97 COCCA, supra note 2, 9-10 (noting that “in cases in which a female becomes pregnant, she is 
assumed to be the victim”); 26-27 and Chapter 4 (discussing the historical use of statutory rape laws 
“to target men for the impregnation of young impoverished women”); Oliveri, supra note 11, 493; 
Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal Law: In Search of Reason, 22 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 119 (1997) (arguing that the selective use of statutory rape to target pregnancy 
“risks overlooking the harm caused to the many children who do not become pregnant, as well as 
overlooking all harm to boys and pre-pubescent girls”). 
98 Oberman, supra note 95, note 33 (noting that in cases involving two minors, “practically 
speaking, the law distinguishes victim from perpetrator by virtue of reporting: The victim is the one 
whose parents first complain to the police”); Sutherland, supra note 15, 322 (noting that statutory 
rape cases involving consensual sex among teenagers “are usually brought to the attention of the 
criminal justice system by parents or by welfare officials”). 
99 A similar criticism can be made in relation to cases of adult-minor statutory rape, and the use 
of prosecutorial discretion to refrain from prosecuting cases that appear to involve conventionally 
consensual sex. This discretionary approach to statutory rape enforcement generally is not without 
its controversy (as Sutherland (supra note 21, 332) notes, it depends on an “operative definition of 
“consensual” [that] may allow for considerable violence and coercion. The implicit message is that 
the consent of certain girls to certain boys is presumed on the basis of class and racial stereotypes”), 
but is beyond the scope of this Article. See, generally, Oberman, Master’s House, supra note 23; c.f. 
Phipps, supra note 33.  
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2. Undefined Punitive Target May Lead to Discriminatory 
Prosecutions of Unpopular Minors and Over-Criminalization  
This vagueness100 also raises equal protection and fairness concerns, 
in that factors such as gender, sexual orientation, race, economic class, 
social background, parental involvement/complaints and prior sexual 
experience may improperly influence enforcement decisions due to 
assumptions about what type of sex is harmful, who is harmed by sex 
and who is an aggressor.101 Those assumptions will “not always be borne 
out by the facts”,102  and could potentially reflect bias, for example 
against boys, gay or queer youth, previously unchaste minors, or 
interracial couples.103  
Moreover, because statutory rape is a strict liability offense, if a 
prosecutor designates a minor the “true offender” based on perceived 
victimization, such as in the case of B.A.H., it does not need to prove 
that the sex was in fact abusive, coercive or otherwise harmful. 
Accordingly, the minor is not given an opportunity to answer the implied 
but undefined charge of victimization, even in the face of severe 
potential lifelong penalties and stigma that can follow a statutory rape 
                                                      
 
100 I am not making a due process void-for-vagueness argument; I am in agreement with courts 
that have found statutory rape laws define the legally prohibited conduct clearly, even as applied to 
sex among minors (see, e.g., In re Welfare of B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158; L.L.N. v State (1987, Fla App 
D2) 504 So.2d 6; Re John C. 569 A.2d 1154 (Conn. 1990); c.f. In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio 
2011) (holding that a statutory rape provision, as applied to a child under the age of consent, is 
unconstitutionally vague). Rather, my argument is that as far as they can be applied to members of 
the protected class, the use of statutory rape laws to target the true/factual victim is premised on a 
vague and subjective notion of victimhood, which raises policy and equal protection concerns. 
101 Phipps, supra note 33, 413 (arguing that “an obvious implication of such overly broad 
discretion is that it would unnecessarily open the door to improper considerations in the charging 
decision”). 
102 B.B. v State, 659 So.2d 256, 261. 
103 See, e.g., Sutherland, supra note 15, 332-33; 335-36 (discussing how factors such as gender, 
class, race and sexual orientation impact social tolerance for adolescent sexuality and the 
enforcement patterns of statutory rape laws); ANN J. CAHILL, RETHINKING RAPE, 173 (2001) (noting 
“assumptions concerning the sexual aggressiveness of men and the sexual passivity of women”); B.B. 
v State, 659 So.2d 256, 261 (Fla. 1995) Justice Kogan (concurring) (“Attempting to brand one as the 
aggressor and the other as the victim raises very serious questions of equal protection, especially 
where prosecutors always assume that one type of child – such as “the boy,” or the one who is 
“unchaste” – must be the aggressor” and noting that “some children - even boys - fall into a tragic 
cycle of sexual exploitation by others, which robs them of virginity but certainly does not indicate 
they are aggressors. And I am utterly unwilling to say that repeat victims of sexual exploitation must 
be considered aggressors merely because of prior victimization by third parties”); Gammons v Berlat, 
696 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1985) (13 year-old boy, but not consenting 15-year-old female partner, subject 
to criminal statutory rape proceedings, when both under age of consent); Kay L. Levine, No Penis, 
No Problem, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 357, 376-379 (2006) (discussing evidence of bias against male 
perpetrators in statutory rape cases generally); Oberman, supra note 95, 382 (arguing that “the two-
dimensional script rendering all boys predators cannot be any more accurate than the script that 
divides girls into virgins and whores”); Goodwin, supra note 40, 530-1 (noting evidence of bias 
against black males in statutory rape cases generally); Higdon, supra note 78, 224 (discussing the 
use of statutory rape laws to marginalize and stigmatize LGBT teens); Fischel, supra note 21, 301. 
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conviction or adjudication. This could result in mere fornicators being 
unfairly labeled child abusers, an over-criminalization problem that, as 
discussed above, arguably dilutes the moral authority of statutory rape 
laws and produces unjust consequences for minors.104 
3. G.T. v Vermont 
The Supreme Court of Vermont pointed to these problems in the case 
of G.T. v Vermont, which involved a similar fact pattern to B.A.H.,105 in 
holding that Vermont’s statutory rape law could not be applied to 
members of the protected class. 106  The G.T. court criticized the 
prosecutor’s approach, which is reportedly common, 107  of bringing 
statutory rape proceedings against a juvenile only when it believes the 
juvenile has committed rape. This approach ensures the prosecutor 
…does not have to prove the presence of the exact 
elements it found to justify the prosecution. Thus, the 
prosecutor determines what crime the juvenile has 
committed, but charges in such a way as to ensure that the 
juvenile never has the opportunity to show that he or she 
did not commit the crime found by the prosecutor. … 
[T]he selective enforcement of the underlying statute has 
the hallmarks that other courts have relied upon to find 
discriminatory prosecution.108 
Consider a hypothetical: Ellis, aged twelve and Riley, aged eleven, 
four months younger than Ellis, have sex at Riley’s suggestion.109 Riley 
has been socialized to believe it is normal and acceptable to try to 
persuade someone to “give out”. Ellis was hesitant at first but eventually 
acquiesced, because Ellis has been socialized to believe that failure to do 
so will lead to social stigma and exclusion.110 Riley has already been 
                                                      
 
104 Supra Part III.A.2. 
105 Infra at notes 142-143 and accompanying text. 
106 In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301 (Vt. 2000). 
107 Supra note 69. 
108 In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 306. 
109 Consensual sexual activity is rare but not non-existent among ten, eleven and twelve-year-
olds (Finer and Philbin, supra note 30, reporting that 3.7% of American children have had sex by 
their thirteenth birthdays, although noting that sex in this age bracket is more likely to be 
nonconsensual). 
110 On the impact of socialization on juvenile sexual behavior, see, generally, Oberman, supra 
note 85; Stodghill, supra note 11 (reporting a Rhode Island study of 1700 sixth- and ninth-graders 
that found 65% of boys and 57% of girls believe it is acceptable for a male to force a female to have 
sex if they’ve been dating for six months); CAHILL, supra note 103, 185 (arguing that “the social 
structure imposed upon sexual interactions demands that girls … fend off the advances of sexually 
aggressive boys …, who are in turn responding to social demands to enact such aggressive roles”); 
Oberman, Master’s House, supra note 23, 820; Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 9, 
713-7 (on the problem of non-voluntary sex among teenagers, arguing that “the combination of girls’ 
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sexually active with other peers, partly in an attempt to mask the pain of 
being sexually molested as a young child;111 Ellis was a virgin. Ellis 
contracts a sexually transmitted disease from Riley, and the parents get 
involved. Ellis’ parents insist that their child would never willingly have 
sex at such a young age, and press for statutory rape proceedings to be 
brought against Riley. 
Is there a victim-offender binary here that warrants a finding of 
abuse, or is this mere fornication, albeit troubling in terms of the 
children’s young age and the harmful sexual health outcome? There are 
no easy answers or bright lines when it comes to the “murky middle” 
between healthy and normal (consensual, safe, mature) juvenile sex and 
outright rape. But in relation to a strict liability sex abuse statute that 
defines the objectionable conduct as sex with a minor (as opposed to, say, 
coercion, transmission of disease, impregnation or sex with a previously 
chaste minor), Ellis and Riley are similarly situated: each is legally a 
violator and each is supposed to be protected by statutory rape laws. 
Prosecutors seeking to target problematic minor-minor sex using 
statutory rape laws are left to define factual/true victimization in relation 
to sex within the protected class as they see fit. As Justice Dooley noted 
in his dissent in P.M., 
[w]hen a prosecutor, a trial court, and ultimately a majority of 
the members of this Court find the age differential between 
the participants sufficient or find the presence of “exploitation” 
(without defining that concept)—in short, when their 
sensibilities are sufficiently offended by the conduct—they 
are willing to find delinquency, but otherwise not. This is far 
too amorphous a standard on which to ground an adjudication 
of juvenile delinquency.112 
                                                                                                                         
 
age-appropriate naiveté and insecurity and the norms of male sexual initiative make bad bargains 
inevitable”). 
111 See, generally, Gail Ryan, Theories of Etiology, in JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDING, 15, 25-
26 (Gail Ryan and Sandy Lane eds., 1997) (noting that sexual victimization and exploitation may 
result in deviant sexual behavior in juveniles); B.B. v State, 659 So.2d 256, 261 (noting the victim-
victimizer cycle); ZILEY AND ZILEY, supra note 10, 113 (noting that “many juvenile offenders have 
experienced both physical and sexual abuse during childhood and adolescence” and arguing that 
many juvenile sexual offenders are “children at risk”, rather than “risky children”). 
112 In re P.M., 592 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 1991). See, further, In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528 (holding 
that a statutory rape provision, as applied to a child under age thirteen who engaged in sexual contact 
with another child under age thirteen, is unconstitutionally vague and violates equal protection as 
each child is a member of the class protected by the statute); In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301 (construing 
statutory rape statute narrowly so as to be inapplicable where alleged perpetrator is also victim under 
age of consent; to construe broadly would be inconsistent with legislative policy, raise possibility of 
discriminatory enforcement, and implicate constitutional privacy concerns). C.f. State v J.A.S., 686 
So.2d 1366 (1997 Fla. App.) (finding that decision by a prosecutor to charge only some offenders, 
where all were below the age of consent, is not a ground for a claim of denial of equal protection, 
because prosecutorial discretion can be exercised to determine relative culpability where there are 
multiple violators); In re Hawley, 238 Mich.App.509 (1999) (finding that decision to charge 15-
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In short, where statutory rape provisions that are broad enough to 
encompass victimless minor-minor sex are used to target perceived 
victimization among minors, the definition of victimization and the 
indicia of victimhood are left to prosecutorial discretion and the law is 
inherently vague and pliable.113 Given the complexity of the policy issues 
surrounding adolescent sexuality, the contested and evolving normative 
boundary between “good”, “bad” and “wrongful” adolescent sex, and the 
potential for discriminatory prosecutions of unpopular minors that 
subvert the purported gender/orientation/race/chastity/class-neutrality of 
statutory rape laws, greater statutory clarity is required. Policy decisions 
about when and how to use sex abuse laws against the class that has been 
deemed in need of protection should be clearly legislated. Otherwise, 
there is a risk of unfairly presuming victimization and legally creating a 
victim-offender binary through selective prosecution, when in fact the 
sex was not abusive.114 This is concerning as a matter of equal protection, 
and also as a matter of policy for the potential to treat mere fornicators as 
abusers, possibly subject to registration as sex offenders, but without a 
right of reply.115 In this way, a law designed as a shield for minors may 
                                                                                                                         
 
year-old male but not 12-year-old female for same act of consensual sex, when each was under age 
of consent, did not violate equal protection because individuals were not similarly situated in view of 
the greater protection afforded by legislature to younger individuals); In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158 
(2014, Minn.) (State’s decision to charge fourteen-year-old minor but not his consenting thirteen-
year-old partner with statutory rape, when both below age of consent, was rational and did not 
violate his constitutional rights to equal protection); In re T.A.J., 62 Cal. App. 4th 1350 (1st Dist. 
1998) (holding that statutory rape statute may be constitutionally applied to member of the protected 
class; question of when, who, and under what circumstances minors should be charged under 
statutory rape law must reside within sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion); T.C. v Hawaii, 214 
P.3d 1082 (finding that twelve-year-old minor who had non-forcible sexual contact with seven-year-
old child [age of consent: fourteen] failed to show that filing of petition against him, but not two 
other alleged participants, was based on arbitrary classification). 
113 Phipps, supra note 33, 417-8; Kay Levine, The External Evolution of Criminal Law, 45 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2008) (“[W]here the formal language of the statute is broad and there is 
no stable consensus as to the harm caused by the prohibited behavior, variation in enforcement over 
time is likely to thrive.”). 
114 State ex rel. Z.C., 163 P.3d 1206 (warning against “creat[ion of] a perpetrator and a victim 
through selective prosecution”). Similar arguments have been raised in relation to the selective 
enforcement of statutory rape against adult defendants (see, e.g., Richard Delgado, No: Selective 
Enforcement Targets ‘Unpopular’ Men (Statutory Rape Laws: Does it Make Sense to Enforce Them 
in an Increasingly Permissive Society?), 82 AM. BAR. ASS. J. 86, 87 (1996) (arguing that statutory 
rape laws cannot be enforced uniformly, and that enforcement patterns are influenced by class and 
race, thereby “providing a weapon against men from social groups we do not like”), although in 
cases of adult-minor sex there is only one legal violator, and it cannot be said that the law is being 
used as a sword against one it was designed to shield.  
115 The issue of overbroad prosecutorial discretion, resulting in inconsistent and arguably unfair 
prosecutions of minors in the absence of factual victimization or abusive conduct, also arises in the 
related context of “sexting” and child pornography charges. See, e.g., Joanne Sweeny, Do Sexting 
Prosecutions Violate Teenagers’ Constitutional Rights?, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 951, 988-990 (2011); 
Elizabeth C. Eraker, Stemming Sexting: Sensible Legal Approaches to Teenagers’ Exchange of Self-
Produced Pornography, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 555, 570-573 (2010); Wood, supra note 54, 170-
171; but see Mary Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate Societal 
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utterly fail to protect its intended protected class from injustice and 
discrimination. 
 
IV. REFORMULATING THE LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSE TO SEX 
AMONG MINORS 
Cases like B.A.H. illustrate that adolescent sex often takes place in 
“the gray area between consent and coercion.”116 The legal response to 
sex among minors should account, as far as possible, for the lack of 
bright lines distinguishing morally permissible sex from morally 
impermissible sex, consent from coercion, and normal sexual exploration 
and experimentation from sexual exploitation;117 and the spectrum from 
childhood vulnerability and immaturity to adulthood competence and 
autonomy.118 
This lack of bright lines has been used in defense of a statutory 
scheme that prohibits all sex, consensual or otherwise, among minors and 
leaves it to prosecutors to determine which cases of minor-minor sex, 
where both minors are technical violators, involve sanctionable 
victimization by a “true” offender.119  Prosecutorial discretion is one 
answer to the complexity of adolescent sexuality, but I have argued 
herein that the risks of over-criminalization and subjective, 
discriminatory and inconsistent enforcement are too high, and the 
consequences thereof for individual minors are grave.120 Prosecutorial 
                                                                                                                         
 
Response to Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2007) (arguing “sexting” 
constitutes “self-exploitation”, to which prosecution is an appropriate response). 
116  Oliveri, supra note 19, 485. See, further, Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist 
Critique of Rights Analysis, 63(3) TEXAS L. REV. 387, 427 (1984) (arguing that “these two 
categories [equal consensual sexual intercourse on one hand, and bad, coercive sex imposed upon a 
female by a male aggressor on the other hand] constitute a continuum of sexual relations; there is no 
bright line between them”). 
117  Martinson, supra note 11, 51 (noting “a marked trend toward greater heterosexual 
experience of preadolescents with their peers in the United States”), 53 (“Children continue to 
engage in both autoerotic behaviors and sexual interactions with peers throughout childhood…it is 
apparent that children have always been sexual and continue to be sexual.”); GIBSON AND VANDIVER, 
supra note 63, vii (noting that “much of the juvenile activities tagged as “sex offending” are no more 
than fairly innocent developmental exploratory sexual activity”); but see Finer and Philbin, supra 
note 30 (noting that “sexual activity among the youngest adolescents is frequently of a different 
nature than that of middle and older teens, in that it is frequently nonconsensual”). 
118 Supra, at notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
119  See, generally, Oberman, Master’s House, supra note 23, 825; Oberman, Regulating 
Consensual Sex, supra note 9. See, e.g., In re T.A.J., 62 Cal. App. 4th 1350 (1st Dist. 1998) (holding 
that statutory rape statute may be constitutionally applied to member of the protected class; question 
of when, who, and under what circumstances minors should be charged under statutory rape law 
must reside within sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion); T.C. v Hawaii, 214 P.3d 1082, 1097 
(finding that “the legislative intent was to maintain the … prohibition on [consensual sexual conduct 
between members of the protected class] and to rely on … the proper exercise of prosecutorial and 
judicial discretion, to avoid criminalizing or unjustly penalizing sexual activities between children”). 
120 Supra Parts IIIA and IIIB. 
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discretion “cannot be accepted as a substitute for a sufficient law”.121 To 
better shield alleged “true offenders” from unjust or discriminatory 
proceedings under the very laws designed for their protection, the use of 
statutory rape laws against minors should be predicated on a clear and 
objective definition of the punitive target. At the same time, sexual 
assault laws generally should be strengthened to more adequately 
respond to cases of coercion and nonconsent among minors and to better 
ensure the protection of true victims. Finally, sexual assault laws may 
need to be supplemented by other policy measures designed to target 
“bad” but not necessarily “wrongful” sex among minors. I discuss each 
in turn. 
 
A. Clarifying the Punitive Target of Statutory Rape Law 
There are many possible outcome-based indicia that could be used to 
clearly define and identify impermissible victimization in the context of 
sex among minors—for example pregnancy,122 infection, loss of chastity 
or severe emotional disturbance. However, just because a minor-minor 
sexual encounter leads to a harmful outcome for one or both of the 
minors, this does not mean the sex was necessarily exploitative. There is 
an important distinction between “A’s act harms B” and “A’s act exploits 
B.” 123 And as discussed in Part III, there are strong reasons of principle 
and policy for confining the use of statutory rape laws, with their 
weighty stigma, lifelong consequences and moral gravity, to sex with a 
minor that is abusive and not merely harmful, sex that is wrongfully 
exploitative (morally impermissible) and not merely “bad” (morally 
unworthy).124 This is not to discount the gravity of the potential harms of 
premature sexual activity on vulnerable and immature minors,125 but 
rather to say that if the law seeks to target harmful outcomes even in the 
absence of exploitation, sexual abuse offenses are not the appropriate 
                                                      
 
121 Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1102 
(1952). 
122  Defining pregnancy as exploitation is controversial, as it would arguably embed and 
propagate the idea that pregnancy is a harm done to girls by boys, denying both the sexual agency of 
girls and the parental responsibility of boys. Even if in practice the burden of child-rearing falls 
squarely on teen mothers rather than teen fathers (Michael M. v Superior Court of Sonoma County, 
450 U.S. 464, 472-3 (1981)), criminalizing impregnation of a minor by another minor will do little to 
remedy that social injustice. See, generally, Oliveri, supra note 11, 492-96. 
123 WERTHEIMER, supra note 8, 96. 
124 Id., 220 (arguing that harmful sexual outcomes are “not a reason to regard the consent as 
invalid between the parties”). 
125 Id., 121 (arguing that consent “may change an act from lead to silver but not necessarily to 
gold”). 
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tool.126 The difficulty with seeking to so confine statutory rape laws as 
applied to minors is in defining exploitation, which as Professor Levine 
notes is “a complicated and somewhat abstract phenomenon, vulnerable 
to the “I know it when I see it” type of definition”.127 Given these 
considerations, how should a clear legal line be drawn between “just sex”, 
albeit oftentimes harmful, and sexual exploitation when it comes to 
juvenile sexual encounters?  
1. Tripartite Definition of Exploitation: Inequality, Coercion 
and Nonconsent 
To answer this question, it is useful to turn to clinical research on 
juvenile sexual deviancy. Clinical experts on problematic juvenile sexual 
behavior point to a definition of sexual exploitation that draws on three 
elements: nonconsent, inequality and coercion.128 Forcible rape and other 
non-strict liability sexual assault offenses tend to focus on nonconsent, 
“the strongest and clearest characteristic of sexual abuse.”129 However, it 
is often difficult to determine the existence of meaningful, informed 
consent, especially when sex involves compliant children or easily 
influenced younger adolescents. In the absence of clear evidence of 
nonconsent, it is necessary to consider inequality and coercion as 
indicators of abusive sexual encounters.130 
Inequality and coercion are closely related, in that the former refers 
to differentials—of development, assertiveness, power and authority—
that are “often the tools of coercion: [for example] perceptions of power 
or authority may be exploited to coerce cooperation, while size 
differentials may coerce compliance.”131  The challenge with crafting 
statutory rape laws that adequately and narrowly target abusive sexual 
encounters involving inequality and/or coercion among juveniles is in 
defining indicia of those elements clearly. As Rich notes, 
                                                      
 
126 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. Gender-neutral, outcome-specific laws (e.g. 
targeting all fornication, or sex that results in pregnancy or sexual infection) would be a more 
principled method. See In re Jessie C, 656 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (finding state failed to demonstrate 
that the prevention of early pregnancy can be better served by a gender-based law than by imposing 
a deterrent sanction upon both participants); Levine, supra note 69, 713 (2006).  
127 Levine, supra note 69, 713. 
128 Ryan, supra note 69, 4 (“In any sexual interaction, the factors that define the nature of the 
interaction and relationship, and define the presence or absence of abuse or exploitation are consent, 
equality, and coercion.”); RICH, supra note 63, 22. 
129 RICH, supra note 63, 23.  
130 Id., 25 (“Clear and unmistakable lack of consent eclipses the need to assess for the presence 
of inequality or coercion as factors that define a sexual behavior as abusive.”). 
131 Ryan, supra note 69, 5. See, further, RICH, supra note 63, 25 (noting that “coercion is 
closely related to inequality, and implies power or control of some kind”). 
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…in any relationship between an older and younger 
sibling or person, or a smarter and less smart, a bigger 
and smaller, or more powerful and less powerful person, 
inequality is present in the very fabric of the relationship; 
thus inequality itself cannot serve as the factor that is the 
agent of coercion or induces consent. It is the quality of 
the difference – how the juvenile uses it to gain advantage 
and the juvenile’s knowledge of the inequality – that 
makes it an element of abusive behavior, and not the 
inequality itself. Similarly, it is the type, intensity, and 
purpose of coercion that identifies its role as an avenue of 
abuse. … [E]ven though we can point to sexual behavior 
as abusive in the absence of true consent and in the 
presence of inequality and coercion, it is also clear that it 
is the particular combination of circumstances and one or 
more of these elements that come together to produce 
abuse.132 
One response to these challenges would be to simply specify that 
statutory rape laws may only be used against a minor in cases involving 
evidence of exploitation as determined by clinical psychologists or other 
adolescent professionals with expertise in assessing and evaluating 
sexual behavior. This would arguably go some way to addressing the 
potential for error and bias in the identification of the “true offender” and 
“true victim” by prosecutors in cases where each minor is legally a 
violator, and allow a nuanced, case-by-case approach to sex within the 
protected class.133  However, in the absence of a legal definition of 
exploitation, this is still a highly subjective and therefore manipulable 
approach that does not give adequate notice as to when minor-minor sex 
is prohibited and when it is permissible. 
2. Age-Disparity Approach to Sex Among Adolescents 
A clearer approach to defining the punitive target of strict liability 
rape laws as applied to the protected class is to use age differential as a 
presumption for exploitation.134 This can take one of two forms. The 
                                                      
 
132 RICH, id., 25-26. 
133 See, generally, RYAN, supra note 69, 3 (“Definition of the acts that constitute sexual abuse 
cannot be approached in terms of behavior alone. Relationships, dynamics and impact must be 
considered.”). 
134 Age-gap-based statutory rape provisions are generally supplemented with provisions that 
criminalize sex within certain status relationships—such as parent/child, teacher/student, 
coach/player—that are considered to involve an inherently coercive power differential. For the sake 
of simplicity, this Article focuses on the former; for a discussion of statutory rape provisions that 
focus on positions of authority used to coerce a minor, see Kitrosser, supra note 14, 333-34 (arguing 
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more common approach is to eliminate liability for statutory rape in 
cases of sexual contact between minors within a specified age-span.135 
An alternative age-based approach is to specify a single age of consent 
and a corresponding minimum age of defendant, such that minors below 
that minimum age cannot be liable for statutory rape.136  
The age-span approach involves dividing the class protected by age-
of-consent rules into age brackets or tiers, whereas the minimum age of 
defendant approach establishes a single protected class. Both approaches 
narrow the focus of strict liability rape laws to sexual contact involving 
an age-gap as a proxy for exploitation—only sex across age-brackets, or 
adult-minor sex, is presumptively abusive. Where sexual contact occurs 
within a protected class (that is, within the specified age-gap, in the case 
of age-span jurisdictions, or among any two minors, in the case of single 
age-of-consent jurisdictions), strict liability does not apply and 
exploitation must be targeted with the use of nonconsensual sexual 
assault crimes such as forcible rape. In other words, statutory rape’s 
function is confined to that of a shield, not sword, with respect to 
members of the same protected class. This restores the internal moral 
logic of rape law generally, by precluding one-sided statutory rape 
prosecutions in which the true offender raises the equal protection 
argument that he is also a victim.137 It also clarifies for juveniles, parents 
and mandatory reporters alike that the law is concerned with abuse, as 
evidenced by an age disparity, and not mere fornication.  
The age-based “shield not sword” approach also eliminates the 
incongruity, noted by the Z.C. court, of laws that deem minors to be too 
young to consent to sex, but also treat them as “able to form the intent to 
                                                                                                                         
 
that “per se criminalization for [certain] status relationships…is appropriate, given that, … such 
relationships are of the type that inherently create a context of constructive force from which courts 
cannot, given a progressive understanding of consent and coercion, extract a vision of meaningful, 
uncoerced consent”). 
135 See, e.g., REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON, § 9A.44 (sexual intercourse with someone less 
than 16 years of age is illegal, with the following exceptions: if the victim is at least 14 years of age 
and the defendant is less than 4 years older than the victim; if the victim is at least 12 years of age 
and the defendant is less than 3 years older than the victim; if the victim is less than 12 years of age 
and the defendant is less than 2 years older than the victim). 
136 See, e.g., VERMONT STATUTES, Title 13 and In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301 (Vt. 2000) (holding a 
defendant must be above the age of consent to be liable for statutory rape). 
137 For an example of such an argument being successfully made in relation to sex that 
appeared to involve a victim-offender binary, see In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528 (D.B. was originally 
charged with both forcible rape and statutory rape, but the trial court could not find evidence of force 
during the sexual contact); followed in In re D.R. 2012 WL 5842773 (involving 11-year-old juvenile 
who allegedly engaged in sexual conduct with a four-year-old juvenile – finding neither can be 
charged with statutory rape, following D.B.); c.f. In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, Justice Page 
concurring (noting that argument that defendant’s partner X.X. was also guilty of statutory rape 
“harkens back to a day when sexual assault victims were considered as culpable as the perpetrators 
of such assaults”). 
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commit what would be a felony if committed by an adult.”138  By 
confining the scope of statutory rape laws to cases involving a 
predetermined age differential, the law effectively deems minors capable 
of consenting to sex with similar-aged or younger minors, but not adults 
or their elders, and the incongruity drops away. 
Age-based definitions of exploitation preclude discriminatory 
creation of an artificial or arbitrary victim-offender binary by selective 
enforcement against one of two legal violators, by deeming the elder the 
offender. This gives greater protection to minors from unjust statutory 
rape proceedings based on gender, sexual experience, sexual orientation 
and other factors. However, the age-based approach does not preclude 
the possibility that cases involving mere fornication—sex that was not in 
fact exploitative—may be deemed criminal. For example, if two thirteen-
year-olds embark on a consensual sexual relationship in a jurisdiction 
that sets a single age of consent/minimum age of defendant of fourteen, 
their sexual contact is beyond the scope of statutory rape until the point 
when one of the minors turns fourteen, at which point the sex is deemed 
nonconsensual and thus exploitative. 139  The age-gap approach is a 
preferable and more nuanced approach, in that it accounts for the 
possibility of meaningful consent between, say, an older adolescent and a 
younger adult; however it may still capture “just sex”. For example, it is 
conceivable that a mature and responsible thirteen-year-old might be able 
to give meaningful consent to sex with a sixteen-year-old, but in some 
                                                      
 
138 State ex rel. Z.C. v State, 2005 UT App 562, 128 P.3d 561, f/n 6 (Utah Code § 76-5-404.1 
requires intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to any person or intent to arouse or 
gratify the sexual desire of any person). See, further, State v J.A.S., 686 So.2d 1366 (1997 Fla. App.) 
(upholding the prosecution of a minor for statutory rape but noting the “potential incongruity of 
punishing one under 16 who is supposed to be protected from the sexual advances of others because 
of his or her age and inability to fully consent to sex…”); Meiners-Levy, supra note 40, 510 (arguing 
that “[i]t is hard to imagine that when a legislature designs a criminal statute, providing that no child 
under a given age is capable of consent to sexual activity in any context, the legislators also envision 
that a child under that age would be subject to prosecution for sexual conduct.”); State v Edward C. 
(1987, Me) 531 A2d 672 (upholding prosecution of minor for statutory rape, but conceding that 
there was merit in defendant’s argument that purpose of the statute was to “criminalize the 
exploitation of children, not to penalize the children themselves”). C.f. T.W. v Illinois, 685 N.E.2d 
631, 637 (finding that once the minor defendant “assumed the status of an accused…he relinquished 
his right to protection [under the statute]…”). 
139 See, e.g., In re J.L., 800 NW.2d 720 (finding that the application of the statutory rape statute 
[age of consent: 13] to juvenile, who engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with his 12-year-old 
girlfriend when juvenile was 14-years-old, did not yield an absurd result, but calling to the attention 
of the Legislature the “other significant consequences” resulting from the statute, such that J.L. 
would be required to register as a sex offender for life). But see Phipps, supra note 97, 121-22 
(arguing that “once the premise of children’s capacity to consent is accepted and legislatures define 
the applicable ages, the “borderline” cases [involving a defendant “barely” above the age of consent 
and a close-in-age consenting minor victim] must be accepted as within the appropriate range of 
behavior governed. Legal distinctions based on age that have significant consequences are 
commonplace and are enforced daily”).  
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age-span schemes this would constitute statutory rape.140 A larger age-
gap may better reflect the reality of adolescent sexual competence. 
3. Objection: Age-Based Definition of Exploitation Under-
protects Minors from Coercive Peers  
Age differentials are not perfect proxies for exploitation. It is 
possible for relationships involving a significant age gap to be non-
exploitative; it is also possible for elements of inequality, coercion and 
nonconsent to be present in a same-age context. One criticism of an age-
based approach to sex among minors is that it may under-protect 
adolescents, particularly girls, from non-forcible coercion by their peers, 
by focusing exclusively on sex involving a significant age-disparity or 
evidence of force.141  
For example, in the case of G.T. v Vermont, G.T. was adjudicated 
delinquent for statutory rape. The Supreme Court of Vermont overturned 
the adjudication, construing Vermont’s statutory rape statute as 
inapplicable where the alleged perpetrator is also a victim under the age 
of consent. According to the facts as found by the trial court, G.T., a 
fourteen-year-old, was watching a movie with his twelve-year-old female 
neighbor, when he “surprised [her] by suddenly engaging in sex with her 
even though they had never had any sexual contact prior to that time”.142  
The girl did not resist, but when G.T. asked if it hurt and she said yes, he 
did not stop his conduct. Given these facts, Justice Johnson in dissent 
argued that delinquency proceedings against G.T. were not inappropriate. 
He further argued that the majority’s ruling abrogated statutory rape as a 
stopgap for cases where “forcible rape will be difficult to prove, 
notwithstanding the presence of subtle coercion resulting from the age 
differential of the participants or other factors”.143 
                                                      
 
140 See, e.g., ALABAMA CODE, § 13A-6-62 (2nd degree rape: engaging in sexual intercourse 
with someone of the opposite sex more than 12 years of age and less than 16 years of age where the 
defendant is at least 16 years of age and at least 2 years older than the victim). See, generally, 
Human Rights Watch, No Easy Answers: Sexual Offender Laws in the US, 19(4) HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (September 2007), 65-77 (discussing cases of conventionally consensual adolescent sexual 
relationships that gave rise to statutory rape convictions and lifelong sexual offender registration). 
141 See, e.g., COCCA, supra note 2, 57-59; Oberman, supra note 85, 73. 
142 In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 316. 
143 In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 316. See, further, In re John C., (1990) 20 Conn.App 694 (finding 
that to hold that statutory rape statute should not apply to minors themselves protected by the statute 
would “give minors license to sexually molest other minors”); COCCA, supra note 2, at 61 (arguing 
that age spans “leave a swath of vulnerable teens unprotected, open to coercion that is not 
recognized as meeting the legal definitions of forcible rape”); Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory 
Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 337-38 (2003) 
(noting that statutory rape may serve as “‘the fallback position’ … In these cases, defendant is only 
convicted of statutory rape because of the difficulty in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
sexual intercourse was accompanied by force or threat of force, or other statutory determination of 
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This argument assumes that prosecutors will only use statutory rape 
to target cases involving coercive or nonconsensual sex, and not, for 
example, other perceived harms such as consensual incest, queer sex, 
loss of chastity or pregnancy; a questionable assumption.144 Moreover, 
even assuming that statutory rape proceedings against minors are used 
restrictively to target non-forcible but morally impermissible “subtle 
coercion” among minors, this raises the question of how prosecutors 
should define coercion and what “other factors” should be relevant to the 
inquiry.  
Professor Oberman has written extensively on the dangers of sexual 
coercion among minors, coercion that can be exerted even between 
minors who are similar in age: 
…[T]his coercion may be so commonplace, and so deeply 
scripted into contemporary norms of sexual interaction, 
that it is all but invisible. As such, the exclusive focus on 
cases involving wide age disparities may serve as a 
grossly underinclusive proxy for estimating the risk of 
exploitation and coercion in sexual encounters. In short, 
to the extent that statutory rape law is enforced 
predominantly or exclusively in cases involving wide age 
disparities, an important category of victims is left 
unprotected.145 
Oberman and other commentators point out that inequality and potential 
coercion are not solely a function of age, but can also be contingent on 
other factors, such as sexual experience and gendered social norms.146 
Consider gender. In its first iterations, statutory rape was primarily 
concerned with protecting the premarital chastity of girls.147Accordingly, 
until reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, statutory rape laws were gendered 
and required that the female victim be of previously chaste character.148 
Feminist-led modern reforms led to gender-neutralization of statutory 
                                                                                                                         
 
nonconsent”); Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 9, 710 (arguing that statutory rape 
laws are “a necessary complement to conventional rape law, which offers little protection to the 
teenager who, due to fear, confusion, coercion, or inexperience, has “consented” to unwanted sex”); 
Oberman, Master’s House, supra note 23, 815-23 (discussing the use of statutory rape laws as “a 
back up to the laws penalizing forcible rape”); Olsen, supra note 116, 407 (arguing that “statutory 
rape laws may prohibit certain instances of sexual assault that should be considered illegal, but 
cannot be prosecuted as forcible rape”; and discussing the case of Michael M. v Superior Court, 450 
U.S. 464 (1981) as an example); Levine, supra note 69 (“Quasi-forcible rapes have long been the 
mainstay of statutory rape prosecutions.”). 
144 See supra note 101-103 and accompanying text. 
145 Oberman, Master’s House, supra note 23, 813. 
146 See, generally, Oberman, Master’s House, supra notes 23 and Turning Girls Into Women, 
supra note 62. 
147 COCCA, supra note 2, 11; Oberman, Master’s House, supra note 23, 802; Michael M. v 
Superior Court of Sonoma County 450 US 464 (1981), 494-95. 
148 COCCA, supra note 11, 11, 15. 
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rape statutes in all states by 2000,149  but to what extent do male-
aggressor/female-victim stereotypes continue to influence statutory rape 
enforcement? And how can the law guard against such stereotypes—to 
the extent that they may fail to adequately accommodate female sexual 
autonomy and protect boys from unfounded accusations and predatory 
females—while also acknowledging the possibility that the socialization 
of boys to pursue and girls to acquiesce can in some cases result in 
gender-based power dynamics that are relevant to questions of consent 
and coercion among peers?150 
The discretionary use of statutory rape laws in select cases of minor-
minor sex is arguably a suitably nuanced means of protecting minors 
from coercive peers where it would be difficult to prove forcible rape.151 
It is important to acknowledge that many cases in which courts have 
reviewed one-sided statutory rape proceedings against minors did indeed 
involve troubling fact patterns showing evidence of pressure, bribery or 
coercion, and concurrent charges of forcible rape, but that could not be 
proven at trial. 152  However, as discussed above, the discretionary 
enforcement of statutory rape laws against “true offenders” where both 
minors are legally violators is rife with potential for discrimination and 
                                                      
 
149 Id., 22. 
150 See, e.g., In Re John L., (1989, 5th Dist) 209 Cal App 3d 1137 (case involving girls who 
agreed to sex with an older boy because they “wanted to be his friend”). See, generally, Oberman, 
supra note 85; Oberman, Master’s House, supra note 23; Kitrosser, supra note 14, 288-89 (arguing 
that “to the degree that a “formal equality” approach [to statutory rape] ignores [the] social context 
[that deems male aggressiveness and female passivity the norm in sexual relations], it risks 
perpetuating inequality by refusing to see it”); Goodwin, supra note 40, 515-16; CAHILL, supra note 
103, 171 (noting the relevance of “political and social structures that seriously limit women’s agency 
and autonomy” to the question of the conceptualization of consent); Sharon Thompson, Search for 
Tomorrow, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 350, 362 (Carole S. Vance, 
ed., 1984) (“the early stages of romance are still differentiated by gender. He: Will she let me? She: 
Does he care for me?”); Ken Tennen, Wake Up Maggie: Gender Neutral Statutory Rape Laws, 
Third-Party Infant Blood Extraction, and the Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy, 18 J. OF 
JUVENILE L.  1 (1997) (discussing feminist objections to the gender-neutralization of statutory rape 
laws in the 1990s which “eliminate the right of a young, minor woman to be protected as the 
presumed victim”); Olsen, supra note 116, 412 (arguing that “any acknowledgement of the actual 
difference between…males and females stigmatizes females and perpetuates discrimination. But if 
we ignore power differences and pretend that women and men are similarly situated, we perpetuate 
discrimination by disempowering ourselves from instituting effective change.”). While the incidence 
of female adolescents who sexually abuse remains unknown, it is not zero (Gail Ryan et. al., Special 
Populations: Children, Female, Developmentally Disabled, and Violent Youth, in JUVENILE SEXUAL 
OFFENDING, 380 (Gail Ryan and Sandy Lane eds., 1997)); ZILEY AND ZILEY, supra note 10, 103; 
GIBSON AND VANDIVER, supra note 63, 114-129 (discussing female juvenile sex offenders); see, e.g., 
In re Anderson 116 Ohio App. 3d 441. 
151 Olsen, supra note 116, 411-12 (arguing that age-gap exceptions “would not address the 
problem of male sexual aggression that characterizes society at large”); RYAN, supra note 63, 3 
(arguing that “as age differences narrow and the behaviors become less intrusive and/or less 
aggressive, the interaction and relationship between the two juveniles needs evaluation [to identify 
exploitation]”). 
152 See, e.g., In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio 2011); In re Welfare of B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158; 
In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301 (Vt. 2000). 
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inconsistency based on prosecutorial beliefs about the normative 
boundary between bad and wrongful sex, with no right of reply,153 
thereby potentially under-protecting many members of the class that 
statutory rape laws are supposed to protect. Moreover, as Professor 
Oberman points out, prosecuting cases that are properly characterized as 
involving forced sex as mere statutory rape arguably “undermines the 
seriousness of the offense of forced sex, and thus erodes the legitimacy 
of laws against rape”.154 Accordingly, rather than using statutory rape as 
a stop-gap for forcible rape, it is preferable to restrict the use of such 
laws against members of the class they protect, and instead consider how 
rape law generally can be strengthened and supplemented. 
 
B. Strengthening and Supplementing Rape Law 
Premising statutory rape law on an age-based definition of 
exploitation does not require uncritical acceptance of voluntary sexual 
contact among juveniles as non-exploitative. 155  Rather, in cases of 
possible exploitation within the protected class, the burden should be on 
the state to prove exploitation that constitutes (non-strict liability) sexual 
assault or rape.156 To the extent that the age-gap approach to statutory 
rape may leave some minors unprotected from coercive sexual 
encounters with their peers,157 this indicates that rape law generally may 
be deficient, and should be strengthened and supplemented. Indeed, as 
Oliveri notes, “continually falling back on statutory rape to compensate 
                                                      
 
153 In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 306 (Vt. 2000) (noting that by charging as statutory rape, the 
prosecutor “does not have to prove the presence of the exact elements it found to justify the 
prosecution”). 
154 Oberman, Master’s House, supra note 23, 822. 
155 C.f. In Re John C. 569 A.2d 1154 (upholding delinquency adjudication of minor defendant 
for statutory rape, stating that “we will not interpret the law to give minors license to sexually molest 
other minors”). See, further, J.A.S. v State, 705 So.2d 1381 (recognizing the State’s compelling 
interest in protecting minors from older minors); T.C. v Hawaii, 121 Hawai’i 92, 214 P.3d 1082 
(noting that “the protection of all young children from sexual assault, regardless of the age of the 
offender, is not inconsistent with sound public policy”); P.G. v State, 616 S.W.2d 635 
(Tex.Civ.App.1981) (“Children are entitled to no less protection from other children who sexually 
abuse them than they are from adults who sexually abuse them.”); In re Gladys R (1970) 464 P.2d 
127. 
156 In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 309 (Vt. 2000) (“We also doubt that we impose upon prosecutors 
by forcing them to prove the crime they believe occurred, rather than allowing them to rely on the 
relaxed burden of proof under [statutory rape].”). See, further, Meiners-Levy, supra note 40, 510; 
Phipps, supra note 33, 408 (noting that “statutes that objectively identify unacceptable behavior 
[such as age-gap statutory rape laws] in no way exclude the possibility of prosecuting cases of 
‘problematic sexual encounters’ [involving coercion]”). 
157 COCCA, supra note 2, at 61 (arguing that age spans “leave a swatch of vulnerable teens 
unprotected, open to coercion that is not recognized as meeting the legal definitions of forcible 
rape”). 
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for deficiencies in other areas of criminal enforcement makes it less 
likely that these deficiencies will be examined ad addressed”.158 
Many sexual encounters among minors involve an incontrovertible 
victim-offender binary—most obviously, molestation of a pre-pubertal 
child by a post-pubertal teenager.159 It should first be noted that such 
sexual contact would be clearly proscribed by statutory rape law under 
an age-span approach unless the minors were close in age. In that case, 
or in a single age of consent/minimum age of defendant jurisdiction such 
as Vermont, such an encounter should constitute (non-strict liability) 
rape due to the obvious incapacity of pre-pubertal children to understand, 
much less consent to, sex. In jurisdictions where proof of force or 
resistance is still required, it would be possible to strengthen rape law’s 
response to pre/post-pubertal minor sex by legislating a presumption of 
unlawful moral or psychological force in cases involving sexual 
encounters between a pre-pubertal and a post-pubertal minor.160 
To the extent that rape law may still fall short of the goal of 
adequately protecting juveniles from coercive sex, especially coercion 
among those close in age, a great deal of relevant work has been done on 
how to strengthen rape law generally, such that the law properly 
identifies and sanctions nonconsensual sex even in the absence of 
physical violence.161 Professor Kitrosser points out that while there may 
be political resistance to expanding the definition of nonconsensual sex 
to include coercive but non-forcible intercourse generally, legislators 
may be more receptive to such reforms in the case of sex involving 
minors where “sympathy for [their] unique vulnerability…should 
                                                      
 
158 Oliveri, supra note 11, 502-03. 
159 Ryan, supra note 69, 3 (“It is clear that an older adolescent sodomizing a small child is 
sexual abuse.”); Phipps, supra note 33, 430 (“[S]exual activity by a pre-pubertal child is … 
inherently harmful regardless of the child’s expression of willingness.”); Drobac, supra note 39, 48 
(discussing neurological development and the connection between puberty and the ability to 
formulate consent).  
160 See Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (finding that “forcible 
compulsion” includes “moral, psychological or intellectual force” and that the respective ages of the 
victim and defendant is relevant to determining whether requisite force was used); Eskridge, 526 
N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ohio 1988)) (finding “subtle and psychological” force can satisfy the force 
requirement). It should be noted that “age is not … a reliable indicator of puberty, as physical and 
emotional development can occur over extended periods when pubertal processes are under way” 
(ZILNEY AND ZILNEY, supra note 10, 63). 
161 See, generally, Phipps, supra note 33, at 438-440; STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED 
SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998), 15 (arguing that “existing 
criminal law resolves the dilemmas of sexual autonomy by making almost no effort to control abuses 
that are not physically violent”); GIBSON AND VANDIVER, supra note 63, 42-3 (reporting that “it has 
been well documented among juvenile sex offenders that force is rarely used; manipulation and 
verbal coercion are more likely”); Fischel, supra note 21 (discussing the need for “a more robust 
standard of consent for adult-minor and minor sexual relations”); Kitrosser, supra note 14, 328-9 
(discussing the need to criminalize nonconsensual sex “regardless of the presence or absence of 
force”, particularly with regard to proving rape of a minor). 
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provide an easier “sell” for the argument that nonconsensual sex is in 
itself a sufficient violation to justify criminalization”. 162  Professor 
Schulhofer has proposed a model of affirmative consent that requires 
“positive willingness, clearly communicated” by words or conduct.163 A 
number of jurisdictions have adopted an affirmative consent model,164 
and in recent years many schools and colleges have rolled out  “yes 
means yes” policies, combined with educational initiatives aimed at 
establishing an affirmative consent culture. 165  Phipps notes that the 
affirmative consent model may be particularly useful in the context of 
adolescent sex, as it provides a clear rule that is easily understood by 
children and teenagers.166 
Admittedly, even an affirmative consent model will not catch every 
instance where acquiescence to sex is obtained by lies, manipulation, 
persuasion or subtle coercion, factors to which adolescents may be 
particularly vulnerable.167  Indeed, as discussed above, there is good 
reason to suppose that a great deal of adolescent sexuality occurs in the 
context of certain social structures, including gender-based norms, that 
may lead minors to make harmful sexual decisions. In B.A.H., for 
example, X.X. testified that he wasn’t forced to have sex with his cousin, 
but that “he [B.A.H.] convinced me because he’s my favorite 
cousin…”.168 Is this impermissible coercion or permissible persuasion? It 
is possible, perhaps likely, that this was at least a “bad bargain” that 
                                                      
 
162 Kitrosser, supra note 14, 329. 
163 SCHULHOFER, supra note 161, 271. See, also, Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 
in SEX, MORALITY, AND THE LAW (Lori Gruen and George Panichas, eds., 1997) (proposing a 
presumption of nonconsent in the absence of communicative sex). 
164 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §22-3001(4); MINN. STAT. §609.341(4)(A); In re M.T.S., 129 N.J. 
422, 443; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9A.44.010(7); WIS. STAT. ANN. §940.225(4). 
165 See, generally, Nicholas J. Little, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational 
Results of an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321 (2005). 
166 Phipps, supra note 33, 439. See, further, Fischel, supra note 21, 308, 320-23 (discussing 
“affirmative consent as a hedge against the social structural vulnerabilities and forms of dependence 
particular to young people” and arguing that the affirmative consent standard should be incorporated 
vis-à-vis sex among minors and sex between minors and adults); Kitrosser, supra note 14, 309, 329 
(discussing affirmative consent as “a crucial step in the general law of rape, helping to dismantle the 
notion of “normal” sex as that in which a man is free to presume access to a woman’s vagina unless 
she puts up a particularly loud fight or unless he employs unusually forceful means to gain access” 
and that such a standard “could play a particularly important role in catching many instances of 
coercion to which adolescent girls…may tend to be particularly susceptible”). 
167 Oberman, supra note 95, 320 (arguing that “[s]ociety’s inability to embrace a strong 
criminal law norm in response to coercive sexual encounters between acquaintances renders teens’ 
sexual exploitation more a rite of passage than a crime”); Kitrosser, supra note 14, 330 (discussing 
limits of the law in directly combating deeply internalized sexism that causes girls to make bad 
sexual bargains with boys); Oberman, Master’s House, supra note 23, 822 (arguing that “to the 
extent that we deprive prosecutors of the option of using statutory rape, we hold underage victims of 
acquaintance rape to the standards of adult victims, standards that assume a sense of maturity and 
self-possession that many adolescent girls lack”). 
168 In re B.A.H., 829 N.W.2d 431, 434. 
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caused emotional harm to X.X.169 But given that the law also considers 
B.A.H. a vulnerable minor, himself liable to making harmful sexual 
decisions, I contend that in such borderline cases, non-punitive 
preventative educational and rehabilitation measures are the fairest way 
to challenge unhealthy social norms about sexuality and to discourage 
“bad sex” among minor-peers, while recognizing the important 
distinction between naïve experimentation and sexual aggression and 
predation.170 It would also be possible to craft supplementary juvenile-
specific offenses that target instances that fall short of forcible or 
statutory rape, but are morally problematic or likely to be harmful to the 
minors involved. This could take the form of an offense of “anti-social 
juvenile sexual behavior” that brings juveniles within the reach of the 
law on the basis of clearly defined indicators of irresponsible and likely-
harmful behavior such as impregnating multiple partners, participating in 
group sex, 171  bribery or sex while voluntarily intoxicated. Such an 
offense should be focused on rehabilitation, re-education and victim 
support,172 with awareness that deviant or abnormal sexual behavior 
among minors may itself be an indicator of prior sexual trauma.173 In this 
way, the law can intervene and respond to cases that evince worrying 
coercive, predatory or manipulative tendencies while maintaining a 
distinction between harmful sex and wrongful sex, sex per se and sexual 
abuse. 174 
 
                                                      
 
169 Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 9, 713-17 (on the problem of bad sexual 
bargains among teenagers). See, further, Sharon Thompson, Search for Tomorrow, in PLEASURE 
AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 350, 352 (Carole S. Vance, ed. 1984). 
170 For an example of rehabilitative and educational measures in the context of sex among 
adolescents, see Nowack, supra note 69, 894-95 (discussing Dane County, Wisconsin’s Responsible 
Sexuality Course). See, further, Goodwin, supra note 40, 536-37 (discussing market incentives as a 
means of promoting healthy sexual behavior among teenagers, without resorting to criminal 
prosecutions for consensual sex); Stine, supra note 40, 1223-26 (discussing mandatory sex education 
programs as an alternative to punishing teenagers for consensual sex). 
171 See, generally, GIBSON AND VANDIVER, supra note 63, 45-46; Garfinkle, supra note 63, 193 
(noting evidence of the relative prevalence of group involvement in reported rapes by child and 
adolescent offenders); Oberman, supra note 85, note 19.  
172 On the treatment of juvenile sexual deviancy, see, generally, Philip A. Ikomi, Once a Sex 
Offender, Always a Sex Offender? in JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS: WHAT THE PUBLIC NEEDS TO 
KNOW (Camille Gibson and Donna M. Vandiver, eds., 2008). 
173 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
174 State ex rel. Z.C., 163 P.3d 1206, 1213 (Utah 2007) (citing state legislator) (“I think most of 
us would agree that when twelve and thirteen years olds get involved in this kind of behavior it’s 
certainly not something we want to allow or encourage. We also probably do not want to convict 
them both of ‘rape of a child’.”); Phipps, supra note 33, 434 (“Labeling voluntary activity between 
two teenagers as “rape” or “child sexual abuse” would strike most people as incongruent.”). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Adolescents are sexual creatures. Sexual development is an 
important aspect of the transition from childhood to adulthood, and a 
transition that is unique to each adolescent. As society adjusts to the 
notion of adolescent sexual autonomy and privacy interests, there is an 
inevitable tension between recognizing those interests while 
safeguarding a relatively vulnerable and immature population from 
sexual power imbalances and pressures.  
The balance struck in many jurisdictions is to set an age of consent 
that theoretically prohibits all sex among minors, but in practice is only 
enforced in cases involving “bad sex” as defined by prosecutors. This 
can result in proceedings against conventionally consenting minors for 
rape of each other, an absurd outcome that risks conflating mere 
fornication with abuse; or one-sided prosecutions of the “true offenders”, 
prosecutions that may be unjust and that have serious lifelong 
consequences. This approach introduces too much subjectivity and 
ambiguity into an area of law that needs to send clear and consistent 
messages to adolescents about the boundaries of good, bad and wrongful 
sex, and can too easily result in inconsistent and unprincipled legal 
regulation of adolescent sex. To ensure that strict liability rape laws 
shield all adolescents, from unprincipled and discriminatory statutory 
rape proceedings as much as from other predatory minors, the law must 
be premised on objective and clear criteria of exploitation and 
meaningful notions of consent. 
